


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15 January 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2067



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

TUNIS ARAB SUMMIT MEETINGS, RESOLUTIONS DISCUSSED

Report on General Discussions

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Dec 79 pp 28-31

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Complete Dossier of Arab Summit No 10; Tunis Summit Underlined Continued Wager on U.S. Position Till After U.S. Elections; What Happened in Last Moments to Save Summit Resolutions on Southern Lebanon From Failure; Lebanon Given Financial Aid for Which It Has not Asked and It Has not Been Denied All It Went for"]

[Text] Tunis--The Tunis summit which has not been able to constitute more than extension to the Baghdad summit and which has not been able to do more than renew the minimum-limit resolutions adopted by the Baghdad summit--what has this 10th summit of the Arab kings and presidents achieved insofar as the problem of southern Lebanon is concerned?

Before the summit started its works on the morning of Tuesday, 20 November, Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam sat among a group of Arab journalists and talked about the accomplishments of the meeting of the Arab ministers of foreign affairs which prepared for the summit.

Minister Khaddam considered the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs among the most successful meetings held since he became minister of foreign affairs. Furthermore, he believed that the summit conference being held under the most serious conditions experienced by the Arab nation will not be less successful than the summit held in Baghdad.

The statements of the Syrian minister have been interpreted in many ways. Some believe the statements to have emanated from the attitude of "expect good and you will find it" whereas other Arab circles have considered minister Khaddam's statements to be justifiable. Days, and even weeks, before the convocation of the summit, there were numerous wagers, and some of those wagers were American in inclination and identity. The first wager had imagined that if the Arab summit, or some of its leaders, tried to go further than the Baghdad summit had gone, it would be exposed to an explosion and that the beads of the rosary of opposition to the Camp David accords would also be exposed to the danger of being scattered.

There were two Arab theories, each with its own vision of what should be decided so that the Arab reply to Camp David may assume new and effective dimensions and so that means of pressure may be adopted on the basis of the Baghdad summit resolutions to move gradually and progressively from the minimum limit to maximum limits.

The Arabs who had originally put their wager on the Americans have not changed their view of affairs and they still insist on their wagers which call for awaiting U.S. positions and initiatives that will cancel or adjust the Camp David course and will create new facts in the situation to help the realization of a comprehensive Middle East solution, the achievement of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights to establish their state and withdrawal of the Israelis from all the occupied Arab territories.

From the outset, the Arabs making these wagers dropped from their calculations any discussion of the use of Arab oil as a direct weapon against the U.S. policy, preferring to develop the means of political pressure on the United States to achieve this goal.

On the other hand, the other Arabs, led by Syria and the PLO, believe that continuing the wager on the U.S. position is a futile act and that Camp David which is now facing a dilemma and standing at a dead end has to be countered with Arab resolutions that deal it the fatal blow and make the Americans reassess their calculations and change their positions and policy. These Arabs believe that the only means to achieve this goal is to use the Arab oil weapon.

It was evident from the concentrated side consultations, which surpassed in their importance the summit meetings themselves, that the Arabs of the Soviets, if we may use the term, are eager for the unity of the Arab position as reflected by the Baghdad summit resolutions and do not want to lose in any way the minimum limit as the price of other demands, such as the use of the oil weapon against the United States.

This eagerness for continued solidarity over the Baghdad resolutions greatly helped to reduce excessive radicalism in the conference and to make moderation the fundamental base for discussing and debating matters with the purpose of reaching an understanding.

Libyan Chairman Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi refused from the outset to attend the Tunis summit personally and delegated his minister of foreign affairs to represent him. But al-Qadhdhafi continued to express until the last moments before the summit convocation his readiness to attend the summit provided that a resolution to use the oil weapon against the United States and a resolution in support of the Iranian revolution are adopted.

It was very easy for the oil Arabs to accept the absence of the Libyan chairman if this meant dropping the possibility of discussing boycotting the United States and using the oil weapon against it. However, this was not enough, in the view of these Arabs, to solve the problem and to avoid falling into critical pitfalls. It was feared that the Palestinians in the conference, led by Abu-'Ammar, would explode the issue of the oil weapon and would present this issue as an inevitable option which the Arabs have to use to fight the U.S. Camp David policy in the area. This issue commanded a large part of the consultations which took place before the summit and during the "violent" meetings that accompanied this summit.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian resistance leadership found itself facing one of two options:

Either proceed to the end of the road with raising the oil issue and with insisting that an Arab resolution be adopted to use the oil weapon as the most successful means to compel the United States to abandon the Camp David policy;

Or approach this matter flexibly in return for an Arab position supporting the resistance's presence in southern Lebanon and opposing the Lebanese working paper which the resistance had rejected, considering it a paper intended to terminate its presence in the area of southern Lebanon.

The Arab oil countries have known how to exploit the card of the Palestinian resistance in southern Lebanon in the interest of the inclination calling for not getting embroiled in the adoption of oil and political resolutions aimed against the United States.

When the Palestinian resistance felt that its insistence on bringing up the oil issue will cause it to pay the price in southern Lebanon, it accepted the barter offered it--a barter which called on it to forget about embarrassing the summit with the oil issue in return for an Arab position supporting its right to exist on the soil of southern Lebanon.

An Arab minister of foreign affairs said that the success of this deal saved the Arab summit from a failure that the summit had been certain to meet when it started to discuss the developments of the Middle East crisis, the U.S. Camp David policy and the means to bolster the confrontation against this policy.

What contributed toward this success was the predominance of the general Arab inclination insisting on guaranteed continuation of the Baghdad summit resolutions as a fundamental base for Arab solidarity and on not exposing this base to collapse should Arab differences erupt in the conference over what Arab position should be taken toward the United States in the coming phase. Before the start of the summit's first working session, satisfaction

was evident in the circles of the Arab delegations rejecting the adoption of resolutions against Washington. A member of these delegations said that the compromise agreed upon in regard to the oil issue prepared the climate for the adoption of moderate Arab resolutions reaffirming the course of the Baghdad resolutions in confronting Camp David on the basis of the minimum limit agreed upon in the Baghdad summit.

Despite all this, the issue of oil as a weapon in the battle was not altogether absent from the Arab summit because the proposal made by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn somewhat appeased the Arabs on the frontline with Israel, including the Palestinians, while managing not to anger the oil Arabs.

The Iraqi proposal called for an economic Arab summit to study the formulation of a plan that links the oil weapon with the Arab nation's political interests, provided that this plan be submitted to the 11th Arab summit scheduled initially to meet in Jordan.

The Arab delegations opposed to boycotting the United States and to adopting oil resolutions against it believe that between the present time and the convocation of the next Arab summit many new realities capable of changing the present U.S. policy will have emerged.

The next Arab summit will be held, according to the estimates, in similar days next year, i.e. at a time when the U.S. elections will have taken place and when it would be possible to talk about a new U.S. policy toward the Middle East crisis--a policy free of the election pressures and considerations.

This is why the Iraqi resolution was approved quickly when presented to discussion, especially since it was supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The kings and presidents then proceeded to discuss the political means of pressure to foil Camp David and to continue tightening the blockade against this policy at the Arab and international levels without dwelling on the oil issue for too long.

When the Arab kings and presidents began to discuss the formulation of an Arab working plan for the coming phase, the discussion focused on the European role and there was almost unanimous consensus that western Europe's position should be more clearly and effectively on the side of the Arab right and the side of working to achieve a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East crisis--a settlement that brings about full withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and would give the Palestinian people their right to self-determination and to the creation of their state on their own land--and, consequently, on the side of the efforts to drop the Camp David policy and to recognize the PLO officially.

After reaching consensus on entrusting delegations of Arab ministers of foreign affairs to tour the European countries, a tendency emerged within the conference to include the United States in the countries to be visited by the ministers of foreign affairs.

Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri initiated the proposal in this regard, asking the conference to adopt a resolution calling for opening a new dialogue with the U.S. administration and with the U.S. constitutional institutions.

Numayri said that the signs of new transformations have begun to emerge in the U.S. public opinion and that big political and non-political sectors of this public opinion have begun to display an ever-growing understanding of the Arab right, especially the Palestinian people's rights. This is why these new conditions must be exploited to open a new Arab dialogue with Washington to compel it to change its stances toward the Palestinian people's rights and toward the Arab cause.

The strongest opposition to this proposal came from Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat. President al-Asad has come to consider the position of Carter's administration hopeless, as proven by experience. He said that the U.S. administration considers the Camp David accords its firm strategy in the Middle East and that it approaches the crisis on the basis of this logic.

President al-Asad addressed President Numayri, saying that the United States is still plotting against the Arab and Palestinian right and that it has not and will not give anything to the Arab right. If I had a dim hope in the possibility of effecting a change in the U.S. position, I would be the first to go personally to Washington to hold a dialogue with it.

Abu-'Ammar followed the example of the Syrian president in opposing Numayri's proposal and in launching a scathing attack on the U.S. policy, describing it as a policy opposed to the Arab right generally and to the Palestinian right in particular. Abu-'Ammar provided a historical recount of the U.S. positions that harbor nothing but hostility and plotting against the Arab and Palestinian rights. He called for dropping all the wagers on the U.S. policy whose bankruptcy has begun to show in the dilemma being faced by the Camp David negotiations.

Betting on time has been the undeclared outcome with which the Tunis summit has emerged. The Arab kings and presidents who underlined with their consensus the success scored by the Baghdad resolutions in fighting the Camp David policy and in enabling the Arab solidarity to succeed in the face of all the attempts made to bring the Camp David accords from the sphere of the partial solutions that have been confronted with the crisis of the self-rule negotiations to the sphere of comprehensive solutions--these kings and presidents believe that continuation of the Baghdad summit resolutions is the only possible means for continuing the confrontation and that it is impossible to formulate a new and more effective and influential policy in the coming phase.

A member of the Palestinian delegation has acknowledged that the Arab states demonstrated in the Tunis summit that they cannot go farther than the Baghdad summit went because there are still among the Arabs those whose wager on the U.S. position and on the need to wait till after the U.S. elections.

Excluding the opening and final sessions, the Arab summit held only one working session which was devoted to discussing the first item of the agenda concerning the Middle East crisis and Camp David. The second working session in which the Arab kings and presidents were supposed to discuss the problem of southern Lebanon was not held because of the fundamental conflict existing between the Lebanese working paper on the one hand and the Palestinian working paper on the other.

Lebanese Problem

As of the moment the Arab kings and presidents started arriving in the Tunisian capital, the lights were focused on the role awaiting the Syrian president to bring the Lebanese and Palestinian positions closer to one another and to exert efforts to save the summit from failing to reach resolutions on southern Lebanon.

In the side efforts he made in this regard, Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam was stressing that Lebanon had rejected the Palestinian working paper and that the Palestinians had rejected the Lebanese working paper and that, therefore, the solution could only come by compelling both sides to accept the Arab working paper drawn up by the committee emanating from the Arab ministers of foreign affairs because this paper was eager to establish a balance between the Palestinian revolution's right to struggle and the right of the State of Lebanon to sovereignty over its southern territories. Khaddam added that as a consequence, a formula had to be reached to make it possible to implement the Security Council resolutions concerning the south.

What drew the attention of all the conference circles was the intransigence displayed by Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis in all phases of the side consultations and meetings held to emerge with a solution formula for the problem of the south. The Lebanese president's intransigent position spread the belief among some Arab delegations that Lebanon had come to the conference to put the Arabs face to face with one of two things:

Either produce an Arab solution that ousts the Palestinian resistance from southern Lebanon and restores peace to this area;

Or he will go seek an international solution that may perhaps consist of joining Camp David.

The Palestinian delegation members knew how to strengthen this belief among the majority of the Arab delegations and to create an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with the Lebanese position.

The Palestinian delegation charged that the Lebanese working paper entails abolition of the Cairo agreement and the ouster of the resistance from the south for purposes that ultimately serve certain U.S. goals which the latest U.S. initiative had already tried to achieve.

The Lebanese delegation found itself compelled to exert efforts to disperse this atmosphere engulfing the Lebanese position. This caused President Ilyas Sarkis to expand the circle of his contacts with the Arab leaders, especially those with influence, to underline the dangerous situation in the south and to stress the enormous dangers awaiting Lebanon and the Arabs in case the Arab summit fails to adopt decisive resolutions.

Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss said that President Sarkis attended the conference, and had even called for this summit, to avert three dangers threatening Lebanon through its southern part:

The first danger is that of Israel resorting to renewing its attacks on the south in a more ferocious manner.

The second danger is that of the eruption of a sedition in Lebanon that assumes this time serious dimensions that would submerge the Arab area in religious and sectarian seditions.

The third danger is that of internationalizing the situation in Lebanon and of the possible subsequent dangers that may cause more than one Arab country, in addition to Lebanon, to pay the price this time.

Prime Minister al-Huss said that if the Arab summit could not guarantee an end to the Israeli attacks, then it could put an end to the two other dangers, namely: The eruption of a sedition and the internationalization of the Lebanese situation.

In the mini-working sessions that included a number of Arab heads of state, in addition to Abu-'Ammar, the Lebanese president explained these dangers very clearly and stressed that the Palestinians had misunderstood the Lebanese position, [saying]: "They thought that we have come to demand abolition of the Cairo agreement and the ouster of the resistance from the south whereas the truth is that we have come, through the working paper that we have presented, to try to give priority to the implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the south. These are immediate and urgent matters. When we succeeded in implementing them and when Lebanon regains its sovereignty, it will then become possible to discuss implementation of the Cairo agreement."

President Sarkis constantly stressed the need not to indulge in faulty interpretations. Even though the conference atmosphere was from the outset a Palestinian atmosphere, the Lebanese position was understood and a strong conviction developed among the Arab leaders of the need to give the Lebanese president an Arab solution so that he may not be faced with the inevitability of looking for other solutions through internationalization or any other similar channels.

It was obvious from the atmosphere that predominated the summit conference as a result of the open confrontation which erupted between the Lebanese and Palestinian sides that the Arab leaders felt that this was the first time in which they were truly faced with a struggle between two rights: Lebanon's right to regain its security and sovereignty and to avert the fateful dangers surrounding it and the Palestinian revolution's right to survival. Regarding these two rights, President Sarkis once again reaffirmed that adoption of the Lebanese working paper constitutes the beginning of the path toward achieving security and peace in Lebanon, saying that it is not permissible that the Arab states continue to burden Lebanon with all the weight of the issue because Lebanon has endured more than it can withstand and that it no longer has the capacity to endure any more, unless it is at the expense of its future and survival.

Lebanon's Fate and Palestine's Fate

The Iraqi president was frank when he asked President Sarkis: Where do you want to go with the Palestinian resistance and the Palestinians? He then added: I want to be frank with you on matters that you already know, namely that none of the Arab states is prepared to receive the Palestinian resistance on its soil. The Palestinians were in Jordan and you know what happened to them there. They then came to Lebanon and Lebanon has become their only refuge. This has been their fate, as it has been Lebanon's fate.

The Iraqi president went on with his conversation with President Sarkis, advocating more patience and wisdom and saying that Lebanon has no option other than to reach an understanding with the Palestinians until their issue is settled.

The fact is that what President Saddam Husayn said reflected the opinions of all the Arabs kings and presidents who made it evident that none of them is ready to take the responsibility for a decision to oust the Palestinian resistance from the south, keeping in mind that its presence in the south will continue to be a source of danger to Lebanon or at least a justification for continued Israeli attacks.

In the final session in which votes were cast on the resolutions concerning the issue of southern Lebanon, the prevalent belief was that the Arab summit had not been able to score a victory in connection with the situation in southern Lebanon. This failure was reflected in the disappointment prevalent among the Lebanese delegation circles.

The source of this feeling was the mutual reservations expressed by both the Lebanese and Palestinian delegations on some provisions of the resolutions.

The Lebanese side expressed its reservation on the provision calling for "regulating the armed Palestinian presence in the southern areas within jurisdiction of the U.N. forces in accordance with an agreement reached between the State of Lebanon and the PLO."

On the other hand, the Palestinian side expressed its reservation on the provision stating that "the conference has taken cognizance of what the PLO has done in regard to refraining from issuing statements from Lebanon on the actions carried out by the resistance inside the occupied territories."

At the conclusion of the final session and while the delegations were preparing to leave the Tunisian capital, Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss contacted Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and held with him an urgent meeting in which al-Huss expressed his disappointment over the conclusion of the conference with resolutions on which reservations are expressed, saying that these reservations constitute a failure for the summit because they torpedo completely the possibilities of implementation and turn the resolutions into mere ink on paper. Al-Huss proposed that President Hafiz al-Asad take the initiative to intervene quickly and persuade Abu-'Ammar to drop his reservations.

Khaddam asked Prime Minister al-Huss: If Abu-'Ammar drops his reservations, will President Ilyas Sarkis drop Lebanon's reservations?

Prime Minister al-Huss replied that the situation is different insofar as Lebanon is concerned and that Lebanon is forced to maintain its reservations, or at least to turn them into observations, because it will ask on the 19th of next month for extension of the U.N. forces stay in southern Lebanon and this extension may falter if there is an official approval for continuation of the armed Palestinian presence inside the areas of the U.N. forces operation.

Prime Minister al-Huss, accompanied by Minister Khaddam, then proceeded to President Hafiz al-Asad's suite and reviewed the situation with him from this angle. The Syrian president was persuaded and immediately contacted Abu-'Ammar who went to President al-Asad's suite and held a short private meeting with him after which the Palestinian leader was persuaded of withdrawing his reservations.

It was also agreed to hold an emergency meeting at the airport VIP lounge where the Arab kings and presidents will have arrived in preparation for departing.

In the VIP lounge, Abu-'Ammar announced to the Arab kings and presidents withdrawal of the PLO's reservations on the summit resolution concerning the south. In his address, Abu-'Ammar said: Our presence in Lebanon is temporary and transitory. We hope it will not be prolonged and that it will end shortly. He also said that the Palestinians reject a substitute homeland for Palestine and refuse to be resettled in Lebanon or in any other Arab country. Had we wanted resettlement, we would have accepted the Camp David accords which are tantamount to a plan to resettle the Palestinians in Lebanon.

Abu-'Ammar wanted to reassert this Palestinian position against resettlement to disperse the many fears expressed by President Sarkis in the meetings and consultations held and in which he warned that the continued presence of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon in its current form is only a prelude to their resettlement in the south. He said that this has begun to pose the threat of a sedition erupting between the southern citizens and the Palestinians and assuming serious dimensions throughout Lebanon, and perhaps the Arab area, because Israel and its supporters are still wagering on this kind of regional and sectarian seditions and wars among the Arabs to pass the partition plans.

Though the Palestinian delegation to the summit knew how to use the oil card to get an Arab position supporting the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, the Lebanese president also knew how to get benefits for Lebanon from the evident race emerging between the Syrian and Iraqi presidents to satisfy Lebanon and to achieve whatever gains may be achieved for it.

The most prominent aspect of this race became clear when Iraqi President Saddam Husayn proposed that Arab financial aid be advanced to Lebanon to bolster the steadfastness of the south and to rebuild Lebanon. President Sarkis expressed reservation on this proposal initially and said that Lebanon had not come to the summit to get financial aid because money is worth nothing in the face of the fateful dangers threatening Lebanon's entity. The Iraqi president then reaffirmed his proposal, saying: "Whatever the situation, it is not permissible that Lebanon not be given big financial aid to participate in its enormous burdens."

The Iraqi president set this aid within the limits of 200 million dollars annually, of which one half is to be set aside for reconstructing Lebanon and the other half toward bolstering the south, given every year for a period of 5 years.

At this point Abu-'Ammar spoke, saying that Lebanon has endured a lot and that the proposed aid should be bigger, suggesting that this aid be raised to 400 million dollars annually.

After approval by the Arab states concerned to advance this aid, Abu-'Ammar leaned toward President Sarkis and said to him: "Do you see what I can do for you whenever you are positive toward me."

At this point, a diplomat said: "Lebanon has been given what it did not demand and has not been totally denied what it had come for."

Summit's Secret Resolutions

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Dec 79 pp 31-44

[Article by George Bashir]

[Text] Tunis--Many had expected the 10th Arab summit in Tunis to fail. Rather, many had not expected this summit to convene but to be postponed to a later date when the Arab ministers of foreign affairs disagreed with each other on the proposals contained in the two Lebanese and Palestinian working papers concerning southern Lebanon. The question posed 24 hours before the conclusion of the summit was: What comes after the failure? But after the final session, the question turned into: What comes after the success?

At a special meeting attended by some of the Arab ministers of foreign affairs participating in the Tunis conference, a diplomat asked Arab League Secretary General (al-Shadhili al-Qulaybi) about the reasons that have always obstructed implementation of the resolutions of Arab summits. Al-Qulaybi answered: Because the Arab summits failed to take the Arab reality into consideration and because the resolutions were taken to appease sentiments. Thus, most of the resolutions adopted were beyond the capacity of the Arab states and beyond their ability to implement them, especially since the executive agencies needed were not in existence. This is why most of the resolutions adopted at the Arab League meetings, whether those adopted in the League Council or in the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs or of the heads of state, remained unimplemented. The world stopped believing the Arabs whenever they adopted weighty resolutions. One of those present at the meeting reminded of the statement made by a participant in the Tunis conference when the members of the ministerial committee formed to settle the dispute over the solutions proposed for the situation in southern Lebanon. This participant had said: Why should we disagree? Leave the text as it is "because these words are for consumption."

Those who attended the recent Tunis summit and observed the progress of its work returned with their memory to the last Arab summit convened in Cairo in 1976. After the final session of the said summit and while the Arab kings and presidents were preparing to leave the Hilton Hotel in the Egyptian capital, they saw with their own eyes Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis asking one of the Arab leaders to sign the Cairo summit resolutions. The said

leader took an immediate oath and told the Lebanese president: It is a shame, Mr President. Signatures are not at all necessary and you will shortly see the beginning of implementation of the resolutions.

The Arab League general secretary has persisted in saying after the recent Tunis summit that the resolutions adopted by the conference were adopted to be implemented and that before the first month of the new year passes, those committed to implementation will see the first steps in this regard [sic].

The night of Wednesday-Thursday last week was the longest night in the Tunis conference because the entire world was awaiting the outcome of the labor through which the conference had been going as a result of the various phases of faltering that it had encountered. The sixth floor of the Hilton Hotel on Carthage summit was the stage for the most important, rather the most delicate and serious, consultations among the Arab leaders until that moment. An atmosphere of oneness dominated these consultations for a time but wisdom, reason, seriousness and a sense of the fateful and historical responsibility are what ultimately prevailed as a result of the frankness characterizing the last meeting which was attended by Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira (the conference chairman), Saddam Husayn (the Iraqi president), Hafiz al-Asad (the Syrian president), Ilyas Sarkis (the Lebanese president), Prince Fahd (chairman of the Saudi delegation), Shaykh Jabir al-Sabah (the Amir of Kuwait), King Husayn (the Jordanian monarch), Yasir 'Arafat (the PLO chairman) and al-Shadhili al-Qulaybi (the Arab League secretary general). The suite of the Tunisian prime minister was like an operation room which witnessed the two phases of labor and then the birth of the final resolutions of the Tunis summit.

Several sides had wagered on the failure of the Arab leaders to reach agreement on the desired Arab strategy to confront the coming phase in the wake of the implementation of the second part of the Camp David accords because the oil owners do not relish the idea of using this commodity which is of importance to all mankind as a political weapon. Other sides had wagered on the impossibility of reaching agreement on the future of the U.S.-Arab relations because some regimes do not want to subject the strategy of their political and economic relations and employ it in the interest of the U.S.-Soviet struggle in the area. Other sides had wagered on the failure of the summit because of the Lebanese-Palestinian disagreement over the issue of the south and the issue of how to reconcile the logic of the revolution and the logic of the state on the same land. There were numerous, and big, rumors in the conference lobbies and those disseminating the rumors were found in the corners of the Hilton halls and in the places set aside for the press people. One of the rumors was that a violent clash had taken place between President Sarkis and Yasir 'Arafat, that another clash had taken place between Presidents al-Asad and Saddam Husayn and that a third clash had taken place over the principle of receiving the Iranian delegation and listening to what it had to say at the conference. Other rumors said that Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss had resigned from the premiership because of differences

among the regime members over the Lebanese working paper, that the Saudi delegation had decided to leave Tunis at dawn and before the conclusion of the conference because of the incident at the Holy Mosque in Mecca, etc. However, the results produced by the mini-summit meetings that night refuted all the rumors and exposed their disseminators, in addition to exposing their goals.

The frank-discussion meeting between Presidents Sarkis and al-Asad which preceded the mini-summit and which lasted for 3 hours laid down the first brick in the edifice of Arab detente over the issue of Lebanon and its southern part. This meeting was followed by another meeting which included the Lebanese and Syrian presidents and Yasir 'Arafat and which laid down the second brick in this edifice. Then followed the mini-summit meeting in which the leaders of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Tunisia, in addition to the leaders of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, participated. This meeting complemented the initial preparatory meetings which had overcome the differences that emerged during the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs because the said leaders discussed the crux of the problem profoundly and in the light of its local, regional and international dimensions and ramifications. They discussed it with utter responsibility and seriousness and in a manner free of (neupmanship, demagoguery and compulsion. They, thus, finally reached the common denominators combining the minimum limits of agreement in the various positions and formed out of them a single Arab position on which the Tunis summit attained consensus.

Those taking part in those consultations which lasted until the early hours of dawn admit that numerous disagreements of opinion did occur among some Arab leaders and that more than an argument did take place as a result. But the general atmosphere dominating the discussions of the main leaders of the mini-summit abounded with prudence and with the eagerness to shoulder the historical responsibility amidst the dangerous dramatic developments sweeping the world, especially the Arab world, each of its countries and each of its regimes. The leaders compared the dangers of the disagreement and the benefits of agreement, even if only on minimal limits, and opted for agreement because they had all been aware in advance that the failure of the summit to emerge with decisive, applicable, programmed and definite resolutions will expose them to defamation by the sides that benefit from the disagreement, led by the parties of the Camp David summit.

Those people who took part in the consultations also admit that each leader who participated in the consultations resorted to wounding frankness at times and censure was the soap of the hearts, as the proverb says. It was not easy to include other Arab leaders in the said frank consultations because had the dossiers of Arab differences at the mini-summit been opened, as originally scheduled, at the plenary summit, the Tunis summit would have dispersed without reaching any of the results it has attained.

Oil and Relationship With Washington

The question here is: What are these results?

Those who had prepared for the summit in advance agreed on definite issues which were included in the agenda because they were aware ahead of time that deviation from the set agenda would cause the summit to be lost in the sea of issues over none of which the conferees could agree. This is why it was agreed from the first moment that exclusion of the issue of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute from the summit would give the Moroccan and Algerian leaders the opportunity to participate in the summit works. It is also because of these reasons that the issue of the Iranian revolution and of the dispute between the Tehran and Washington governments was excluded and why the summit leaders even refused to receive the Iranian revolution representatives sent by the Tehran government to Tunis. They refused, as a summit, to receive them but the choice was given to any member of the conference to meet with them separately because such meetings would not be the concern of the conference as a supreme council but would concern every participating country within the framework of its bilateral relations with the new Tehran government. Acceptance of the Iranian delegation would have evoked the sensitivity of not only the Iraqi delegation but also that of the Saudi delegation and of other delegations from the Gulf. Thus, the issue was excluded altogether and the conference did not touch on this issue closely or remotely. The ministers of foreign affairs maintained in their preparatory meetings the agreement to steer clear off whatever may provoke new differences among the (influential) summit leaders attending the meetings of the kings and presidents.

The oil issue was discussed in detail in the mini-summit and it was agreed to threaten with the use of oil as a political weapon as a first phase. Threatening precedes warning and then implementation follows warning. It is the policy of phases or the step-by-step policy.

The United States is currently going through a phase of options that it has never before countered in its relations with the Arab world and the Palestinian issue. Through those who will wage next year its election battle politically, economically, militarily, financially, informationally, and even spiritually and at the humane level, the United States is now discussing the Middle East issue with a new logic and with a tone of give-and-take and of dialogue. It is dealing with the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict with a new mentality. Therefore, the Arab side is required to deal with the United States with the same mentality and not to repel it or be repelled by it, at least not in the election phase that could produce an open dialogue between the U.S. administration and the PLO.

Israel is trapped domestically, regionally and internationally. It is trapped at the U.S. level also. It is seeking a confrontation between the Arabs and the world public opinion, especially the U.S. public opinion, on the threshold of the elections. Israel is seeking an armed confrontation with the Arabs--

a confrontation in which Israel will have the main say in determining the conditions and choosing the time and place because it knows in advance the outcome in such a case and under these regional and international economic and political conditions. In the year of U.S. and European elections, Israel needs now more than ever before, because of its domestic crises, to score a definite military victory that brings back to mind the dazzle of the Israeli military superiority. The mini-summit leaders realized that southern Lebanon, rather the Lebanese stage generally, is the right framework for allurements to reach such a situation. The review presented by Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis to the mini-summit leaders covered all aspects of the problem and all its frameworks. The discussion was confined to the question of how to defuse the situation and foil Israel's opportunity to exploit its exploitation--how to do this with a deliberation that does not harm the political and diplomatic victories scored by the Palestinian cause at the international level on the one hand and that preserves, on the other hand, Lebanon and the surrounding countries from the evils of Israeli attacks, rather from the evil of changing the map of the area in its entirety and of preventing the Arabs from controlling their stragety, their resources and their wealth in the future. Those who watched over the success of the consultations of the mini-summit admit that the leaders who participated in the consultations overcame numerous mines and endured with a patience that was similar at times to Job's patience. Amidst the atmosphere of provocation, rumors and oneupmanship in which each side had placed itself through those surrounding it before, and even during, the summit, it was difficult for any side to make concessions or to cede to any demand, regardless of how justifiable, under the pressure of this atmosphere that was abounding with pitfalls. For example, any capitulation by the Palestinian resistance to an announcement by the summit declaring its support for stopping the fedayeen military operations from southern Lebanon would have angered the radicals and would have even angered the political and ideological organizations that live on the resistance's political and military victories. The same could be said about the Lebanese side. But the participation in the mini-summit by the leaders concerned with the issue more than others guaranteed for the resistance on the one hand and for the Lebanese government on the other the cover required to accept the common Arab denominator of the two conflicting Palestinian and Lebanese views and made it inevitable for all involved but to reach the resolutions that were adopted in the light of the collective Arab political, military and strategic interest. The European and U.S. political transformation in favor of the Arab causes, though not as complete as desired yet, is still a very good transformation and distinguishing landmark between the two periods of the 1950's and 1960's [sic, presumably meaning between the periods of the 1950's and 1960's on the one hand and the present on the other]. This transformation must be countered by wise, alert and logical positions. Rather, the transformation must be encouraged to proceed forward on the positive path through moderate resolutions and positions, with a little threatening. This is why importance has been gained by the resolution to prepare for an Arab economic summit established on profound and advanced studies that rely on the logic

of the reality and free of the influence of the emotions and of the demagoguery that preceded every Arab resolution in the past. The topics of this summit's agenda have already been defined and they consist of balancing the Arab political and economic interests in the Arab relations with the various countries in the light of the positions of these countries vis-a-vis the Arab world so that the benefits may be mutual politically and economically, especially at the oil level. This economic summit will be preceded by visits made by the ministers of foreign affairs to the various countries of the world to hold discussions, to explain the Arab causes and to bolster "the so far limited" international understanding of the Palestinian rights in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is to be done with the countries of the three continents of Europe, Africa and America.

Secret Resolutions

In their consultations, the leaders of the mini-summit proceeded on the basis of tangible facts, the most important being the phase separating the Tunis summit from the conclusion of the Camp David accords. They compared the results of each step. Nobody had imagined that the official, political and popular world public opinion would take the position that it is now taking toward implementation of the aforementioned accords compared, for example, with the sweeping international position [of support] that followed the Egyptian president's visit to Jerusalem and toward the later steps culminating in the phase of the Camp David summit. The European support for the Egyptian-Israeli strategy has receded by more than 60 percent and the positions of some European states that support this initiative in one way or another have become timid. Moreover, the wave that swept the political and popular public opinion in the United States in the wake of the Jerusalem visit and of the conclusion of the Camp David [accords] has also receded. Any negative step that could have been taken by the Tunis summit would have inevitably wiped out all these positive aspects immediately, especially since the relations of some Arab countries with the United States and the extent of their political, economic and financial ties with it do not enable these countries, for one reason or another, to go too far in any negative positions. These Arab countries cannot do this for principled reasons over which these countries cannot be debated.

The mini-summit leaders visualized during their consultations the situation in the Middle East in case the U.N. forces withdraw or are withdrawn from southern Lebanon or in case the situation between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian resistance explodes when no bases are formulated for an Arab solution to the problem of Lebanon and of its southern part. Such a situation will lead to negative results and will, moreover, drag all of them to a premature fifth war in the area with Israel--a war over whose details none of them would have a say under the current international conditions of the area. This is why these leaders adopted a seven-provision secret resolution underlining "Lebanon's full sovereignty over all its territories, preserving

its independence and national unity and the need to establish the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all of southern Lebanon, particularly through the return of the various state administrations and its civilian and military establishments to the exercise of their powers and jurisdiction over the south and the conference's rejection of all the attempts seeking to establish Zionist domination over the south and its holding Israel responsible for all the suffering of the southerners. The conference has also taken cognizance of what the PLO has done in terms of refraining from launching military operations from southern Lebanon and refraining from issuing statements from Lebanon on the operations carried out by the resistance inside the occupied territories. The conference reaffirms the right of the resistance to engage in its struggle from all the Arab (fronts) and stresses the need to implement the Riyadh, Cairo and Bayt-al-Din resolutions, to support the Lebanese government in the various international spheres to exert utmost pressures on Israel to stop its aggression against southern Lebanon and achieve Israeli withdrawal from the south. The conference also reaffirms the need for the full implementation of the Security Council resolutions concerning southern Lebanon and for enabling the U.N. forces to carry out their tasks. The conference also reaffirms the need to regulate the armed Palestinian presence in the areas within the jurisdiction of the zone of the U.N. forces operations in accordance with an agreement between the State of Lebanon and the PLO to facilitate the task of these forces. The conference also underlines the Lebanese government's efforts to deploy the Lebanese army in the south to carry out its national duties and urges all the parties concerned to facilitate this task."

The mini-summit leaders also approved an Arab political and military coordination strategy that calls for advancing financial aid to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO and agreed to exchange military information with each other.

This agreement among the mini-summit leaders was approved by the plenary summit. Political observers have considered this agreement the first cornerstone in the comprehensive Arab political, economic and military strategy, the beginning of the end of the serious and explosive situation in southern Lebanon and the basis fit for solving the difficult Lebanese crisis because the parties to the mini-summit will deal with the parties to the Lebanese crisis without any distinction, on the basis of new realistic approaches, with a flexibility that avoids the pitfalls of the previous approaches and on the basis of the strategy of the Lebanese legitimate authority alone and the policy of the president of the Republic of Lebanon. The observers acknowledge that the cohesion of President Ilyas Sarkis and Prime Minister Salim al-Huss before and during the conference played a prominent role not only in the conference's success but also in helping the conference to reach this strategy. Moreover, the frank Syrian-Lebanese discussions which took place before the conference between Presidents Sarkis and al-Asad and then the frank discussions that took place between them in the presence of Yasir 'Arafat played a major role in helping the mini-summit leaders to reach these solutions

which made Iraqi President Saddam Husayn take the initiative and write down personally the bases for the financial aid to reconstruct all of Lebanon, beginning with Iraq's share of this aid and then the shares of the other countries of this five-year aid which amounts to 2 billion dollars towards which Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya will contribute.

The question that poses itself now is: Will the Arab leaders implement what they have agreed upon?

It is not easy to give the answer now. But this is a new test for the Arabs at the top level, even though implementation did actually begin as of the first moment after the conclusion of the Tunis summit.

Some people may wonder about the practical results produced by the summit at the level of the confrontation with Israel and with the Camp David parties. Moreover, what are the practical results produced by the summit in terms of an actual solution for the problem of Lebanon and of its southern part?

At the level of the common Arab strategy, President al-Sadat can reproach for 6 more months the summit for not reaching an alternative solution to the Camp David accords. But afterwards, al-Sadat will not be able to do so because the Arab strategy will have then begun to emerge through the political, military and economic cooperation and coordination. The oil weapon will, in accordance with the step-by-step policy, replace Egypt as a political power so that the Arabs may fill through this weapon the deep gap and vacuum left by the absence of Egypt from the Arab group as an important political and strategic military force.

As for southern Lebanon, both the Lebanese and Palestinian teams emerged from the summit "neither defeated nor victorious." The situation in all of Lebanon, and not just in the south alone, has become, with the admission of all concerned, a common Arab responsibility. Spreading the national sovereignty, the army and the full authority of the president of the republic and putting an end to the classification act in which some Arab sides engaged against the Lebanese on both the Arab and international stages are things upon which the leaders of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and the chairman of the Libyan delegation agreed with President Ilyas Sarkis. The outcome of the new test that will be undergone by the Arab world at the level of implementation--implementation of what was agreed upon at the Tunis summit--will make it possible to pass a final judgement on the Arab solidarity which is once more in the scales.

Report on Compromises

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Dec 79 pp 34-35

[Article by As'ad Haydar]

[Text] Tunis--"The happy ending" of the 10th Arab summit was expected as a natural and inevitable conclusion for such a meeting at such a level. Failure to issue the final communique declaring "detente and reconciliation" would have meant a "divorce" between Lebanon and the Arabs and the reemergence of the conflicting axes and alliances among the Baghdad summit participants. It would have also meant a subsequent rise in temperature turning some of the current cold and silent wars into hot wars on more than one front.

The half success achieved by the summit eliminated the question prevailing in the halls of the Tunis Hilton and in the air of the Arab homeland, namely the question: What will happen now and how will Lebanon, the Arabs and the Palestinian resistance face the situation? But the "half failure" which is evident in the summit's final communique that has not satisfied either the Lebanese or the Palestinian side and that has imposed somekind of an understanding based on the status quo and the intensifying danger in the Middle East situation have imposed another question, namely: What will happen from now until the next Arab summit in Jordan in November 1980?

With the initiation of the works of the conference of the Arab ministers of foreign affairs at the same Hilton on 14 November 1979, it was evident that the achievement of full success by the summit conference would lead to the approval of a unified Arab policy that would transfer the Arab position from steadfastness in the face of the Camp David accords to a position of confrontation primarily. It also seemed that defusing the situation in southern Lebanon and bringing to end the endless and inconclusive Lebanese war were almost impossible. Each of the Arab delegations fundamentally concerned with the conflict came carrying a working paper that meets at some points with the other papers. But there were among these papers gaps that the goodwill and the deep desire to keep the situation from exploding could not bridge. Perhaps the disagreement and the conflict between the Lebanese and Palestinian working papers was the most evident. The Lebanese delegation, led by Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus, came on the basis of "either a comprehensive solution or no solution." This is what Fu'ad Butrus expressed in one of his statements when he said that "the contents of the working paper are not negotiable and not subject to concessions." Perhaps the only time in which Butrus (resorted to tactics) in his stiff offensive was when the provision in the Lebanese working paper on opening the Arab fronts to the Palestinian resistance was discussed. After approval of the provision on terminating military operations from southern Lebanon and when discussion of the next provision started, the Lebanese delegation tried to add the word "other" to the phrase of "all the fronts" so that the phrase may end up as follows: "Open all the other Arab fronts." But the Palestinian delegation, led by Abu-al-Lutf, realized

the political meanings of this linguistic addition and thus hastened to demand that the word "other" be omitted, and got what it wanted. The Lebanese desire to emerge with Arab acceptance of the Lebanese working paper reached the point where the Lebanese delegation refused to discuss the bases of the financial aid to Lebanon because money comes after, and not before, the solution. This intransigent Lebanese position urged a prominent member of one of the Gulf delegation to tell AL-MUSTAQBAL: "Fu'ad Butrus deserves to be a minister of defense and not the minister of foreign affairs." The Palestinian delegation asserted that in the absence of a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem, there is nothing for it after the south but the sea. The delegation asserted that it will not accept this [end] after these long years of struggle.

The conclusion of the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs complemented the course of the conference's works. The first working paper, concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, was approved and the working paper concerning Lebanon was referred, along with both the Lebanese and the Palestinian reservations, to the summit to adopt a resolution on it.

At the summit which was attended by the largest number of Arab kings, presidents and amirs, totaling 14 altogether, the side meetings and the bilateral meetings in the chambers of the heads of state were the ones which dotted the 11's and crossed the 11's insofar as the conference works were concerned and they were the meetings that made the resolution that was later announced at al-Qayrawan hall where all the delegations met. What had happened in the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs also happened at the summit. The Arab-Israeli conflict paper was approved in the summit's first session and the issue of southern Lebanon continued to be the problem. On Wednesday, 21 November 1979, the issue was presented to the summit. Addresses came in succession from the Arab kings and presidents. The situation became more tense and the intransigence in stances was translated into violent words exchanged loudly. The stance of President Ilyas Sarkis was that Lebanon can no longer endure the war, that it has gotten tired of continuing to be a card in the Middle East game and that nothing could compensate Lebanon other than the restoration of peace, stability, territorial integrity and full legitimacy over all of its lands. This is why the Lebanese working paper presented by Fu'ad Butrus has to be [Sarkis said] approved or at least the joint Arab working paper, especially its fourth and fifth provisions concerning the Palestinian resistance's withdrawal from the south, has to be amended.

Abu-'Ammar, the PLO chairman, answered the Lebanese approach with a word which he intentionally addressed to all those present and not just to President Sarkis alone. He said: "If I withdraw from the south, you will not let me into this hall and I personally would not come. So, what is the meaning of my presence here when I have nothing? Had I stopped or agreed to stop the fighting, you would not have welcomed me here. We will proceed on our

path until we are able to fly the Palestinian flag over Jerusalem." All left the session with the ghost of failure casting its shadow on the summit. This situation urged the most prominent Arab delegations to clarify or reaffirm the positions in side contacts with the journalists. In an interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL, Tariq 'Aziz, the Iraqi deputy prime minister and member of the Revolution Command Council, said: "Nobody can impose all new war. Every inflexible position will be countered by another inflexible position and every flexible position will be countered by another flexible position. Lebanon should approve the Arab working paper as a prelude for further Arab action in the next summit one year from now. Lebanon must accept the Arab aid so that it may contribute toward helping the southern citizens to dress their wounds." As a result of these Arab efforts, rather as a result of the absence of the official Lebanese media, Prime Minister Salim al-Huss held a meeting with the Lebanese journalists at his chamber and explained to them the Lebanese position by saying: "A distinction must be made between two provisions in the Lebanese demand for withdrawal of the armed presence from the south. The first provision deals with the zone of the U.N. forces operations and defines the withdrawal with the words "all the armed elements," i.e. the resistance and Sa'd Haddad and will not do the resistance great harm because all know the small size [of the armed elements] the resistance has in this sector. The second provision deals with the area extending until the Litani River and concerns the armed presence of the Palestinian resistance alone. This provision does not deal with the issue of the "joint forces" which are Lebanese forces. The question of the withdrawal of these forces will be left alone until the issue of withdrawal of all the armed forces from all the Lebanese territories is brought up. Despite Prime Minister al-Huss's efforts to explain the Lebanese position and to stress the need not to be carried away by a counter-propaganda campaign, he was not able to achieve what he wanted. This situation urged a prominent member of the Lebanese delegation to say: "We came with a just and legitimate cause but we have not known how to present it. We have forgotten that we are before an Arab summit and not before a Lebanese round table."

Tripartite Summit Before Agreement

During the evening session, news of the incidents in the venerable Mecca was received and the atmosphere became charged. Talk of Prince Fahd's imminent departure from Tunis for his country dominated the halls of the Hilton Hotel. This would have doomed the summit to failure. But Prince Fahd's composure and the support of the Arab kings and presidents for Saudi Arabia and their public condemnation of the attack prepared the atmosphere for completing the summit's work. However, this situation led to cancelling the meeting that was scheduled to include Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the PLO and Kuwait to find a joint solution.

At 0800 on Thursday, the day set for ending the conference works, the decisive and originally needed meeting took place. President Ilyas Sarkis and Abu-'Ammar met at President Hafiz al-Asad's suite. During this tripartite meeting, the agreement facilitating the establishment of the legitimate authority over the Lebanese territories and preserving, at the same time, the Palestinian resistance, was approved. It wasn't long before the final session, in which the summit's final communique was issued, was convened.

According to reliable sources, some points and resolutions in the two working papers were amended in the following manner: In the first working paper dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, the following phrases were added:

1. The need for the Arab states to participate in the Islamic Solidarity Fund and in the joint projects, to fulfill their financial commitments toward the General Secretariat of the Islamic League Organization and to advance moral and material aid to this organization.
2. Support the Arab Fund for Aid to the African and Arab Countries and support other international funds and organizations.
3. Replace the phrase "within the framework of not separating" by the phrase "on the basis of" in the issue of cooperation with the European group countries. Another phrase was also added to make the passage read as follows: "Cooperation with the European group countries to enhance the joint Arab-European interests and to develop the positions of the European group on the basis of not separating dealings in the economic relations from the political positions of the countries of this group toward the Arab causes and their central link, Palestine." In implementation of this provision, five committees were formed, each headed by a minister of foreign affairs. These committees are divided among Latin America, Asian countries, West Europe, East Europe (Syria will undertake this task) and Africa (the Democratic Yemen, Mauritania and the PLO will undertake this task).
4. The addition of a full point to the 11th provision concerning the relations with the United States. This point is "condemnation of the policy exercised by the United States in regard to its role in the conclusion of the two Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and stressing that the continuation of this policy will have a negative impact on the relations and interests between the Arab countries and the United States of America.
5. Call for a "special" session instead of an "ordinary" session to support the Arab and Palestinian right.
6. The addition of a new provision, namely provision 14, concerning the convocation of the Arab Economic and Social Council which includes the ministers of foreign affairs and of economy to discuss the Arab situation.

Amendments and Reservations

In addition to these amendments, which have been considered a stiffening of the Arab position and the beginning of formulating a new line for an Arab strategy to counter Camp David and while taking into consideration the efforts not to isolate the people's Egypt and to continue isolation of the Egyptian regime, another resolution was adopted but not announced. This resolution calls, according to reliable sources, for granting Somalia, on the basis of a Saudi proposal supported by Iraq, an aid of 40 million dollars shared in half by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Meanwhile, Kuwait pledged to advance an aid of 10 million dollars after bilateral talks with Somalia. Dr 'Ali al-Turayki, the Libyan secretary of foreign affairs, objected to this aid by saying: "Some Arabs remember the Arab causes only when financial issues are discussed."

Insofar as Lebanon is concerned, an Arab working paper was approved. This paper can, in case it is implemented, give Lebanon rest and leave the Palestinian resistance as a fait accompli. The resistance has taken a moral commitment before the conference to stop its operations from "southern Lebanon," keeping in mind that the resistance has maintained its reservation on the third provision which concerns "taking cognizance of the organization's action of refraining from launching military operations from the south," instead of the phrase "across the borders" which was proposed originally. Meanwhile, Lebanon has maintained its reservation on the fifth provision, especially on the phrase "regulating the Palestinian presence" instead of the phrase "withdrawing the armed Palestinian presence."

In addition to these resolutions, Lebanon has been given an aid of 2 billion dollars divided over 5 years, beginning with 1980 and ending in 1984. AL-MUSTAQBAL has learned that one half the annual aid, amounting to 400 million dollars, will be set aside for the south to help its population stand fast and reconstruct their damaged property.

On the basis of these resolutions whose only secrecy lies in the word "secret," the observers are again asking the fundamental question, namely: What will happen in the future, particularly in the coming year?

First, it must be taken into consideration that Lebanon's problem is tied to a solution for the situation in the Middle East area. But at the same time, Lebanon cannot wait until the Palestinian problem is solved. This is why what happened at the Tunis summit constitutes, as viewed by a prominent member, a partial solution on the way to the comprehensive solution. This partial solution will permit Lebanon, through the Arab financial aid, to dress some of its present wounds, both at the level of reconstruction and development and the level of building a modern military force. Such wound dressing will help Lebanon in the future to establish its control over all the Lebanese territories in a manner whereby the legitimate government will not be again

faced with the question: "What has the government done with the Bayt-al-Din resolutions and why isn't the legitimate government establishing its control over Beirut, the mountain [Mount Lebanon] and the north as it wants to establish it over the south which is hanging from the rope of the non-Lebanese wills, as well as the Lebanese will?"

This solution will also permit the PLO to continue its diplomatic offensive in Western Europe, this time with obvious Arab support and with a well-studied plan based on a clear economic plan. This will enable the PLO to gain additional positions, perhaps the first of which will be France [which may be won over] during Yasir 'Arafat's forthcoming visit to Paris. Moreover, the Palestinian rifle will continue to be raised and capable of threatening with military action against Israel and also capable of touching off the situation, depending on the developments and requirements of the coming phase.

The limits of the future possibilities do not stop at these options. There are the other Arab fronts and there is the flaring Iranian front in the Middle East area. The balance of these conditions in all the fronts collectively or in each of them separately [will determine] whether Lebanon can wait another year to make more partial gains or whether it will not be able to stand any longer in the Middle East station with all the Arabs (excluding Egypt) and will look for another means to transport it [to a new situation] that may begin with an explosion and conclude with an unhappy ending, exactly as the beginning of its war was tragic for itself and for the Arabs.

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USSR'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS REVIEWED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Oct 79 pp 55-64

[Article by Emile Pignol: "The Soviet Union and Countries of the Southern Arc: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey"]

[Text] Is the Soviet Union seeking to exploit recent reverses met by Western nations in that arc of countries contiguous to Russia's southern borders from the Black Sea to the Himalayas, a region of turbulence, revolutions in the name of Islam, and economic depression? Emile Pignol, a young researcher at the Political Science Institute and a specialist on that region, answers this question.

The balances of power which have existed for more than 30 years along the Soviet Union's southern border were upset by the April 1978 coup d'etat which placed a pro-Soviet regime in power in Kabul, and also by the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Until recently, countries on the USSR's southern flank were conspicuous, in fact, by their pro-Western attitudes and their mistrust of their big northern neighbor. This mistrust did not, however, prevent them from maintaining satisfactory relations with that neighbor.

Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan continued to retain, officially at least, their membership in CENTO¹, a military organization supported by the United States although it was not legally a member. Only Afghanistan, a long-standing member of the nonaligned movement, confined itself to a position of strict neutrality.

Today, however, the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey and Pakistan as well as the political crisis in both of those countries, all constitute factors of instability that appear likely to mortgage their future.

All things considered, the USSR's entire group of neighbors from the Black Sea to India are, therefore, "destabilized" or in danger of being so.

We shall examine the role the Soviet Union has played in these developments, the opportunities they give that country, but also the obstacles Soviet policy is encountering. In so doing, we shall try to answer the question of whether, and in what instance, the decline of Western influence in the region has meant a strengthening of Soviet positions.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan has long-standing ties of large-scale, but not exclusive, military, economic, and cultural cooperation with the Soviet Union. Yet until last year it had retained its independence from its powerful neighbor by following a policy of nonalignment. The April 1978 coup d'etat and the resultant establishment of a Moscow-backed Marxist regime in Kabul marked a radical turning point in Afghan policy and its regional consequences are considerable. While it has not been possible to prove any Soviet involvement in the coup, it does appear likely that Soviet leaders were kept informed of its preparation.

The Kremlin could not have been anything but pleased to see Afghanistan rapidly enter into the Soviet orbit, as is evidenced by the way Afghan diplomacy has invariably aligned its positions with those of Moscow. Wasn't Afghanistan one of the first countries to recognize the new Cambodian Government and condemn Chinese intervention in Vietnam?

The considerable economic but primarily military aid the Soviet Union quickly granted the Taraki government and the USSR's alacrity in signing some 50 agreements, the most important of which is the 5 December 1978 treaty of friendship and cooperation, clearly show that Moscow does not intend to skimp on ways and means of ensuring the survival of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan.

The USSR's interest in that country is, of course, prompted by a combination of strategic and political considerations. The Soviet Union has, in effect, always endeavored to surround itself with friendly countries that act as buffer states. In addition, Afghanistan's geographical situation, the first "step" to the Indian Ocean, enables Moscow to adopt as its own the old czarist dream of gaining access to warm waters, by taking advantage of Afghan irredentist designs on the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Pachtunistan.

Furthermore, the Soviet leadership's attachment to the dogma of the irreversibility of socialism's conquests cannot help but commit it to maintain its support of a regime which, without being officially socialist, openly relates to the Soviet experiment.

In addition, this Soviet commitment has been increasing in the face of the expansion noted in the Islamic rebellion since March.

This growing commitment has resulted in accelerated deliveries of military equipment and in an increase in the number of Soviet "advisers."²

Because of the magnitude of the rebellion and the increasing number of purges and defections that are thinning Afghan officer ranks, the Soviet "advisers" are now playing a decisive role within the armed forces. Actually they are very closely involved in combat operations. Despite Moscow's denials, it has definitely been established that Soviet pilots are taking part in harassing missions being flown against the rebels.

While Soviet assistance has thus far made it possible to contain the rebellion after a fashion, we wonder what would happen if that assistance were to become insufficient. Should that occasion arise, would the Soviets consider resorting to direct intervention as Afghan Prime Minister Amin has hinted they would? Under the present circumstances, we can only speculate about what might happen. Admittedly, Soviet leaders have on several occasions clearly indicated their firm determination to sustain the present Afghan regime. In this connection, Brezhnev's statements during the June visit to Moscow of Indian Prime Minister Desai—"We will not abandon our friend the Afghan people in its hour of need"—were meant to demonstrate Moscow's determination.

In all likelihood, however, the Soviets will do their utmost to avoid having to make this difficult decision. According to certain rumors, they have advised Taraki to broaden his political base,³ to halt massive purges, and to slow down the implementation of reforms that are too premature for a backward country.

There is no evidence that this moderating advice will be heeded by Kabul officials who, on the contrary, seem determined to pursue a policy of repression. It is questionable, therefore, whether a policy of national reconciliation would have any chance of succeeding in view of the intransigence of not only the authorities but also the rebels who are engaged, with the support of most of the population, in a veritable holy war against the "atheistic" Kabul government.

For the time being, the progress of the rebellion is not such that it can threaten the regime's existence, particularly because of divisions among the different rebel movements. This situation could change rapidly, however. The attitude of the armed forces is still the major unknown factor. The revolt by a garrison in Kabul in early August—the third dissident action within the army in the past few months—was crushed with the help of Soviet pilots. Such defections make one wonder about the army's loyalty to the Taraki regime.

The fact remains, however, that any possible intervention by Soviet armed forces would not fail to have considerable consequences, particularly on the

USSR's relations with Pakistan and Iran who would feel directly threatened. There is no doubt that such intervention would constitute a new stage in the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. In addition, at a time when the summit meeting of the nonaligned countries has recently concluded its deliberations in Havana, this intervention could not but tarnish the Soviet Union's image with the nonaligned movement. Furthermore, it would certainly not contribute to improving the climate of detente and would most likely jeopardize ratification of the SALT II treaty.

Iran

The Soviets abandoned the posture of neutrality they had been observing ever since the start of the Iranian crisis only when the victory of the religious leaders became certain. They apparently did not intervene in the revolutionary process, being merely content to deter the Americans from doing so. We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that they may have encouraged the Iranian Tudeh Communist Party to campaign against the United States so as to channel the Iranian people's discontent in a direction more compatible with Soviet interests.

The creation of a focus of instability on their border may have caused the Soviet leaders some anxiety, but they were, nevertheless, pleased by the fall of the pro-Western Shah's regime and the attendant loss by the United States of its most powerful ally in the Persian Gulf, and especially an ally who intended to act as "policeman" of that region against "progressive" subversion.⁴

Consequently, Moscow was one of the first capitals to recognize the new Iranian regime and offer it assistance. The Soviets viewed with great satisfaction a certain number of "positive" decisions made by the Islamic authorities, such as elimination of the American presence, the closing of electronic monitoring stations, withdrawal from CENTO, cancellation of contracts for the purchase of Western arms, severing of diplomatic relations with Israel and South Africa, rejection of agreements with the oil consortium, etc.

Yet developments in relations between the Soviet Union and Iran these past few months have not confirmed the Kremlin's initial expectations upon the establishment in Iran of a regime hostile to "imperialism." On the contrary, these relations have deteriorated rapidly, notably because of the part played by the Soviet Union in quelling the Islamic rebellion in Afghanistan.

The Islamic fundamentalism of the new Iranian leaders has actually led them to denounce Soviet activities in that country. For instance, in receiving the Soviet ambassador on 13 June, the Ayatollah Khomeyni warned him in rather undiplomatic language⁵ about the Soviet Union's interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Iran. A week later, relations between the two countries deteriorated even further with the Iranian foreign minister's announcement that the provisional government intended to cancel simultaneously the two basic treaties between Iran and the USSR and between Iran and the

United States. This measure only appears to be balanced.⁶ Actually it would, if implemented, deprive the Soviet Union of the "right of inspection" in Iran which it has had for more than 50 years. It will be recalled that the treaty of 1921 allows the USSR to move its troops into Iranian territory if the latter is being used by a third power as a base for aggression against the USSR. This treaty was the basis for the warning Brezhnev issued to the United States in November 1978 in a statement noting that any American intervention in favor of the Shah would be viewed by Moscow as an attack on its security.

For the moment, the Soviets are adhering to the policy of appeasement they have practiced toward Iran ever since the Shah's departure. Yet they are no longer limiting themselves to protestations of good faith whenever they are taken to task. While avoiding all polemic as much as possible, the Soviet press no longer hesitates to criticize Iranian leaders--with the exception, however, of the Ayatollah Khomeyni--who make remarks hostile to the USSR. It also more frequently denounces, and with less verbal precautions, Tehran's favorable attitude toward the Afghan rebels.

Moscow is convinced that the Islamic revolution has an "unfinished" aspect about it. But in view of the present weakness of the Iranian Marxist left, particularly the Tudeh⁷ which is now but a shadow of the large communist party it was shortly after the war, the Kremlin has no choice but to seek some accommodation with the Iranian authorities. Consequently, the Tudeh has up to now followed, probably on advice from Moscow, a "national front" policy that has led it to support the Ayatollah Khomeyni and his proposed Islamic republic. The apparent open clash between the Marxist left and the ayatollah's supporters could place Moscow in a quandary of being obliged to take a definite position on the matter. In another connection, Moscow has refrained from expressing any opinion on the worsening of the situation in those regions of Iran populated by non-Persian minorities: Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Khuzistan, and Baluchistan. Nevertheless, the growing agitation for autonomy, and especially the Kurdish rebellion, offer the USSR a formidable potential means of exerting pressure.

Economically, the Soviet Union wanted to continue the very flourishing cooperation it had with Iran during the time of the Shah. It also entertained the hope of benefiting from Iran's cancellation of numerous contracts with Western companies. But the USSR has been treated no better than those companies by the Islamic authorities. In fact, several major projects with the Soviets have been cancelled these past few months. The largest one was a 3-billion dollar project involving construction of the IGAT-2 pipeline designed to deliver Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Austria, France, and the FRG.

Pakistan

Pakistan's relative isolation on the international scene, particularly in relation to Western countries, has not brought about any rapprochement between Islamabad and Moscow. As a matter of fact, the government of General

Zia-ul-Haq remains essentially true to Pakistan's basic foreign policy orientations founded by Ali Bhutto on active cooperation with the Islamic world and on close ties with China in the face of the Indian "threat." Although Pakistan's relations with the United States have been noticeably affected by Pakistani nuclear plans--the Americans suspended their economic aid last year--leaders in Islamabad are well aware that the American Government cannot take the risk of a break that would accentuate instability in the region. The alternative policy Pakistan seemingly wants to initiate, after its withdrawal from CENTO and its entry into the nonaligned movement, cannot be interpreted as a desire for rapprochement with Moscow. On the contrary, there has been an obvious rapid deterioration in Soviet-Pakistani relations as a result of the mounting antagonism between Islamabad and Kabul. In fact, Pakistan does not hide its sympathy with the Afghan Islamic rebels. Kabul accuses it of helping and of harboring within its territory.

The Soviet Union for its part has issued several warnings to Islamabad and accuses it of playing into the hands of "imperialism" by actively supporting the rebels. Moscow claims are being trained by Pakistani and Chinese advisers. More or less inspired by the Soviets, Afghan leaders now appear to be seriously considering encouraging Pakistani autonomist movements (the Baluchis and Patchuns). In warnings issued to Islamabad, Taraki has openly threatened to give these movements direct support. Under these conditions, Pakistani authorities cannot help but be pessimistic about the future of their relations with the USSR. For the time being, they are striving to thwart, after a fashion, the Soviet propaganda that likens the Afghan rebellion to foreign aggression. We can see, therefore, that the USSR's relation with countries in the eastern part of the southern arc are far from satisfactory. Are they any better on the western end of the arc?

Turkey

Disappointed by the attitude of both NATO and the United States during the Cypriot crisis--the embargo on arms sales imposed in February 1975 by the U.S. Congress was lifted in September 1978, but with severe conditions--Ecevit's government decided to pursue a more open and liberal policy toward the Soviet Union in order to free itself from an altogether too exclusive "tete-a-tete" with Washington.

The rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara was marked by Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to the USSR in June 1978. Even though the theretofore very loose political ties were drawn closer and the already long-standing economic cooperation between the two countries was diversified, one has to note that this evolution was always in conformity with the norms of the policy of detente and was not marked by any important concession by Turkey.⁸

For instance, Turkey rejected Moscow's military-oriented advances, including proposals of cooperation made by Marshal Ogarkov during his March 1978 visit to Turkey, and Soviet attempts to get Turkey to agree to a sort of bilateral military detente. Nor can Turkey's desire to diversify its foreign relations

be interpreted as a means of exerting pressure on its Western allies and even less as a reorientation of its foreign policy.

Under present circumstances, it does not appear likely that Turkey, despite the gravity of its current economic and political crisis, can give up the "Atlantic umbrella" or the economic aid from which its belonging to the West has enabled it to benefit for the past 30 years. Nevertheless, if the military were to assume power through a coup d'etat, Turkey might conceivably question its ties with the West and revert to a policy of suspicious and sensitive nationalism. In that event, the USSR could not help but be pleased with a situation it seems unable to instigate itself.

We note, therefore, that there are cracks in the rampart which has been blocking Soviet attempts at penetrating in the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan has become a Soviet satellite. Iran is once again on the brink of civil war. Turkey is weakened by very serious internal problems. Pakistan is in danger of a secessionist explosion. This particularly gloomy assessment must be qualified, however. The expansion of Soviet influence in the region faces sizable obstacles. The largest of these is the antagonisms between Islam and Marxism. Events in Afghanistan have been most revealing in this respect. It was in the name of Islam that Afghan rebels took up arms against the pro-Soviet Taraki regime. The fact that the two neighboring countries, Iran and Pakistan, are also deeply devoted to Islamic fundamentalism could not fail to compel them to rise up against Soviet encroachments. Moreover, the continued unlawful status of the Turkish and Iranian communist parties--there is apparently no communist party in Pakistan--does not facilitate the USSR's action in those countries. It is interesting to note that the draft constitution published in Tehran includes a provision banning communists from directorial positions. Lastly, we must not forget the lessons of history--particularly where Turkey and Iran are concerned--which have made these countries highly suspicious of their big neighbor. While the successes achieved by the Soviet Union along its southern border are undeniable, their irreversibility remains to be shown.

FOOTNOTES

1. CENTO's activities had actually been extremely limited since 1965.
2. An estimated total of 3,000 to 5,000 Soviet advisers control to a large extent the armed forces and the governmental administrative machinery.
3. The Khalq communist party--now in power after eliminating the Parcham, a pro-Soviet rival faction--has but a very limited membership.
4. The Moscow-supported Marxist Dhofar rebellion was crushed in 1975 by an Iranian expeditionary force.

5. The conversation between the Ayatollah Khomeyni and the Soviet ambassador was broadcast over Iranian radio, in all probability without the ambassador's consent.
6. The American-Iranian treaty is merely a regular defense treaty.
7. M. Kianouri, Tudeh's secretary general, is considered to be "Moscow's man."
8. It should be noted, however, that the Turkish Government has been most obliging on several occasions such as when Soviet military aircraft have flown over its territory and when the aircraft carriers Kiev and Minsk passed through the Straits. Likewise, the negative reply given to the American request for use of Turkish airspace by U-2 aircraft was attributable to Turkey's anxious desire to deal tactfully with Moscow.

8/41

SO: 4800

STUDENT STRIKE, DEMONSTRATIONS DISTURB AUTHORITIES

'Arabizing' Students Strike

Par 3 LE MONDE in French 7 Dec 79 p 4

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Authorities Fear Protest by 'Arabizing' Students May Turn Into Anti-American Demonstrations"]

[Text] Student-organized strikes and demonstrations have generated a certain degree of agitation in Algiers these past 2 days. Police have been able thus far to channel or disperse marches and rallies that have never consisted of more than a few hundred participants. Authorities are, nevertheless, carefully watching developments. They undoubtedly fear that this agitation, whose origins are purely local, may mount and ultimately turn into anti-American demonstrations, as has been the case in other Arab capitals.

Such a development cannot be ruled out especially since this upsurge of agitation is being fomented basically by "Arabizing" students from the Faculty of Law and Economics, students who are probably more eager than others to demonstrate their solidarity with the Iranian Islamic revolution. These students have been on strike for 2 weeks along with students from the Institute of Political Studies. They are requesting that some postgraduate courses be taught in Arabic. At the present time, all their postgraduate courses are taught in French. They are also demanding better job opportunities upon graduation and Arabization of the civil service.

Slogans posted on walls of faculty of law buildings and the Ben-Aknoun student resident hall are revealing: "Unity of languages, unity of spirit (mind)!", "The Arabic language is part of the 1954 revolution!", "Is Algeria a French colony?"

This very determined protest movement comprises some 3,000 students. The problem is not a new one. Last year, "Arabizing" students from the University of Science and Engineering of Bab-Ezzouar, near Algiers, boycotted classes and then examinations because they refused to be "condemned" to only one job market, namely teaching.

The coexistence of two separate curriculums or streams, one "bilingual" the other "Arabized," is becoming an increasingly explosive situation. The principle of Arabization [replacement of French by Arabic as the dominant language in all realms of national life] was solemnly reaffirmed by the December 1978 congress of the Algerian Youth and subsequently by the FLN congress in February 1979. But the spread of Arabization is plagued with difficulties, the greatest being the shortage of qualified teachers.

Algeria is currently engaged in an accelerated development effort. Hence in all fields, particularly the industrial, the country needs highly qualified executive and managerial personnel skilled in modern methods and techniques, personnel who are in constant contact with the West. The majority of such personnel in Algeria are French-speaking. The "Arabizers" are confined to minor positions or to tasks that are not directly productive. They are tolerating less and less being shunted off in this way when official policy views Arabization as a veritable dogma. This dogma was reaffirmed more strongly than ever with the removal, in March 1979, of Mostefa Lacheraf as minister of primary and secondary education and his replacement by Mohamed Kharroubi, a staunch supporter of Arabization.

Early in the week, law students were joined in their strike by lycee [university-preparatory secondary school] students. The latter are protesting a measure which restores certain subjects to the baccalaureat [final examination], subjects on which such examinations have not been required for several years. Under this new measure, science majors will henceforth take examinations in history and geography, while literature majors will take them in physics and natural sciences. This protest movement involves all of the capital's lycees: boys and girls lycees, inner-city and suburban lycees. The thousands of young students boycotting classes are thus at loose ends. In the present climate created by the Iranian situation, this student unrest disturbs the authorities who fear a possible deviation of the protest movement.

For instance, despite the precautions taken and the police forces assigned to maintain order, authorities in Oran were hard pressed Monday when a protest march suddenly headed for the U.S. consulate and got to within 100 meters of the building before being stopped and dispersed. Although no official demonstration has thus far been organized in Algiers, authorities there have taken precautions for guarding and protecting the American embassy.

Public opinion does, of course, largely disapprove of the acts of violence that have been committed in other capitals, and particularly in Tripoli and Karachi. But Algerian authorities must reckon with a large number of young persons who flare up easily and whom certain fundamentalist movements would no doubt like to mobilize. In this regard, the posters displayed in Bab-Ezzouar by a new group calling itself "Students of the El-Harrach Mosque" are quite revealing. The posters announced that the Grand Mosque in Mecca had been bombed by American F-5 aircraft and called upon students to support the Islamic revolution instead of lazily spending the afternoon "in musical siestas by couples" on the university lawn.

Teacher Shortage Hampers Arabization

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Dec 79 p 7

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Calm Returns to Algiers' Lycees While 'Arabizing' University Students Remain on Strike"]

[Text] Calm returned to lycees in Algiers on Monday 10 December in the wake of the Ministry of Education's brief statement on the front page of 9 December's EL MOUDJAHID announcing that "no new subject matter would be added to the 1980 baccalaureat examinations." The authorities had reportedly planned to include examinations in the natural sciences and physics for literature majors and in history for science majors. "Leaked" reports of this plan had prompted a large week-long protest movement that made several attempts to march to the Ministry of Education.

These demonstrations were in all likelihood the expression of a general feeling of utter dissatisfaction, and the rumors about the baccalaureat merely served as a detonator. As a matter of fact, lycee students are grumbling about their working and living conditions: overcrowded classrooms, inadequate libraries and laboratories, shortage of textbooks, transportation difficulties, meager scholarships, etc. They were able to voice all these grievances Monday afternoon at a working meeting organized by the National Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA) attended by university student representatives and several senior government officials. Delegates from the lycees, 10 per school, submitted their demands and deplored the "absence of a forum of expression" capable of taking official cognizance of their problems. In so doing, the students were implicitly condemning the UNJA which appears to have been unable to cope with this problem.

In contrast, silence continues to surround the strike by some 3,000 "Arabizing" students of the Algiers Faculty of Law who could well continue their protest action until the meeting, on or about 26 December, of the FLN Central Committee, the supreme body of Algiers' single political party. The committee is scheduled to examine, inter alia, educational problems and more particularly the ticklish Arabization issue.

The striking students would like to see the central committee establish, at this meeting, a definite and compulsory timetable for Arabization of the civil service. Such a timetable is the only procedure, in their opinion, that is consistent with the principles proclaimed in the Constitution, the national charter, and the resolutions of the most recent FLN congress, and also the only procedure that permits effective monitoring of the implementation of Arabization. They have written letters to this effect to President Chadli Bendjedid, party coordinator M. Yahiaoui, and chairman Boualem Benhamouda of the FLN's education and training committee with whom they have unsuccessfully requested a meeting. The students reject any accusation of "Moslem fundamentalism." They explain: "We are operating within the FLN framework and are simply requesting that officially stated policies be implemented."

Recruiting of Teachers

This is, therefore, a political issue that is clearly beyond the scope of the Ministry of Higher Education. Since his appointment, however, the new head of that department, Abdelhak Berheri, former rector of the University of Constantine, has not spared himself in his efforts to forward Arabization of the university. One of his first actions was to visit Syria, Iraq, and Jordan in May 1979 for the purpose of recruiting teachers. Teachers are, in fact, the major "bottleneck." The results of his recruiting trip were disappointing. Only 22 Syrian teachers have joined the nearly 500 Middle Eastern teachers--20 percent of the total teaching corps--already in Algeria. The cooling of relations with Cairo has not helped the situation, Egypt being the principal pool of cultural assistance personnel.

Yet several pertinent decisions have been made recently. These include: the opening on 1 December of the National Arab Translation and Terminology Center; establishment, within the master continuous education program, of an Arabization program for French-speaking Algerian teachers, some of whom could be sent to the Middle East for training; and lastly, preparations for establishment of an Arabic university-level summer school. Furthermore, "decennial planning guidelines" for the Arabization of the university, beginning with the social sciences, were formulated recently.

The Arabization measures taken by the ministry are coupled with a series of social measures, a fact which undoubtedly accounts for the calm prevailing in all other departments of the University of Algiers. Student grants given to future secondary and technical school teachers have been doubled and all scholarships are to be increased 20 percent effective 1 January 1980. Special emphasis is also being placed on student housing problems and the ministry has had some 30 projects inserted into the next student housing plan.

In the meantime, the university has to cope with tremendous growing pains, and while strike movements may have spared the capital this time, they did affect several provincial university centers at the start of this school year. Particularly hard hit was the Tizi-Ouzou center where student housing problems are especially acute.

8041

CSO: 4400

HIGHWAY PROJECTS ANNOUNCED BY DIRECTOR OF WORKS

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 1-7 Dec 79 p 5

[Text] **BAHRAIN** will start work on BD 16 million-worth of roads projects next year, if the Cabinet approves proposals by the Ministry of Works, Power and Water.

The director of works, Mr Ali Murad, this week unveiled a development programme to cover 20 kilometres of new roads, including major six-lane highways to ease the flow of traffic in both Manama and Muharraq.

It allows for BD1.6 million to be spent on maintaining existing road network in 1980, and BD 800,000 for the compulsory acquisition of land.

Proposed spending in 1980 will be about BD 8 million; another BD 5.6 million of the cost of the programme will come from the 1981 budget, and BD 2.3 million from the budget of 1982.

By that time, further new road projects will be underway, and the 1981 programme calls for a start on BD 8.7 million-worth. Of that, BD 3.4 million will be spent in 1981 and BD 5.213 million in 1982.

Total spending on roads in the 1978-79 budget was only BD 10 million, so road development over the next two years could be increased by 60 per cent.

New year will see major progress on the six-lane highway to provide a "scenic" route from the Muharraq causeway to Bahrain airport.

Nearly three kilometres of new carriageway and two traffic-light-controlled intersections are due for completion by April 1981.

Phase two of this south-east Muharraq ring road project, beginning in January for completion in 15 months, includes a service road for the new coast-guard headquarters and other premises along the shore. This BD 860,000 phase takes the highway from the causeway to the existing section.

Phase three, which starts in February and will be finished in 11 months, completes the ring road as far as the airport roundabout at a cost of BD 1.2 million.

In Manama, the east ring road to Mina Sulman is already entering its final stages, with the 2.5 km of phase two costing BD 1.38 million.

A BD 1.4 million development for the Kuwait Road involves the construction of a four-lane extension for 1.9 km from the rear of the Iraqi embassy to Umm Al-Hassan.

There, a big intersection will serve four major traffic routes: Sitra Causeway, the Mina Sulman approach road, Kuwait Road, and the future south ring road to Kawari Bridge and the Saudi Arabian Highway. This project will start in January and last until February 1981.

Next September, work will start on phase one of the main west ring road, to be known

as the Zinj Road.

This will be a four-lane carriageway leading south from the Dilmun Garage roundabout towards Toobli. It will cover about half the distance to the south ring road at a cost of BD 260,000.

A long list of further road projects for 1980 include:

- October '80 — April '81 — service roads near the central market and open car parking areas (BD 430,000);
- September '80 — May '81 — a link road from Kuwait Road to Shaikh Isa (Jufair) Road, at Moon Plaza (BD 190,000);
- November '80 — June '81 — main distributor roads in West Mahooz (BD 350,000);
- December '80 — March '81 — service roads in the Abu Ghazal area, off Kuwait Road (BD 325,000);
- March '80 — June '80 — improvements such as kerbing and pavements to Shaikh Isa (Jufair) Road (BD 190,000);
- July '80 — December '81 — extension of Government Road Manama from Lulu Road to Naim (BD 300,000);
- September '80 — March '81 — link road from Manama West Ring Road (Zinj) to Kuwait Road (BD 485,000);
- November '80 — February '81 — road for new housing development in north-east Muharraq (BD 250,000);
- December '80 — August '81 — service roads in the Sulmaniya area (BD 200,000).

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

HYUNDAI CABLE DEAL--Midal Cables in Bahrain has signed a \$6 million contract with Hyundai for the supply of aluminum conductor cable. Hyundai is carrying out an electrification project in North Yemen, and will take delivery of the 3,000 tonnes of conductor from February next year, over a six-month period. Midal, a private sector joint venture between Olex Cables of Australia and Intersteel, a Bahraini company owned by the Zayani family, went into commercial production at the end of last year. It takes hot metal from the Alba smelter, for drawing into rod or a wide range of wire cables. [Text] [Manama GULF MIRROR in English 1-7 Dec 79 p 46]

CSO: 4820

SOVIET STRATEGY SEEN BEHIND PRESENT TURMOIL

Communist-Anticomunist Alliance

Paris LE FIGARO in French 16 Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Annie Kriegel]

[Excerpts] On one side we see an America that still has not managed to extricate itself from an initially explosive and then creeping crisis which continues to strike at its most deep-seated convictions, a crisis that does not challenge America's existence but the exercise of its power. This fact is glaringly manifested by the unpromising dearth of candidates of suitable stature for the position of chief magistrate at a time when the United States abounds with top quality men heading its various business and industrial firms.

On the other side we see the Soviet Union continuing its steady upward climb which, at times, seems lightning fast. The USSR has, of course, definitely depleted the reservoir of high expectations which existed at the beginning of its Promethean effort to create a new man in a better and more equitable society. Yet at the same time, the USSR has amazingly succeeded in getting its loyal supporters who initially viewed it as a architect of a halcyon future to now view it, with undiminished loyalty, as the essence of constantly expanding power.

We must make it clear, however, that the power in question is not economic power. Hence there is nothing "modern" about this power if we define modernity as the primacy of economic considerations. One of Khrushchev's fantasies was his proclaiming or even believing that the Soviet economy, in its civilian components, would have to stand comparison with the developed economies. The sources of Soviet power are, on the contrary, altogether traditional, namely the armed forces and diplomacy, but, of course, with the peculiar connotation these two terms have in the communist system. It has become obvious in very recent times that the famous gap between the military capabilities of the two superpowers has narrowed, and to such a point that experts currently waver between two conclusions: either the balance of forces--which is different from the "balance of terror"--has now been achieved, or else has already been upset in favor of the Soviet Union.

But what the 1970's have settled is something which is more in the sphere of diplomacy, provided we correctly define diplomacy as the construction of a system of alliances, or what is known as a "camp" in socialist terminology.

Iran: Revolution and Strategy

What is most striking, and rightly so, about the latest events in Iran is their frenzied character. It is a fact that what has just been violated in Tehran is an immemorial taboo, a foundation of international society just as the taboo of incest is the foundation of human culture. But frenzy is not a sufficiently specific stigma to cover what is peculiar to the Iranian event. For after all, the 20th century is replete with frenzied episodes in which peoples, who perhaps had less excuses than Tehran's wretched masses, have become hallucinated peoples. I recall to mind Germany and its unemployed in the 1930's, Argentina and its "descamisados" in Peron's day, and also, excuse me, America during Watergate. After all, how could anyone possibly draw the utterly ludicrous parallel between the Shah and Hitler and get some people to believe it, other than in an atmosphere of frenzy?

In most cases, however, frenzy does not exclude a strategy, in other words, a logical method of development. The taking of U.S. Embassy personnel as hostages in Tehran was in response to a dual idea, whether that dual idea was preconceived and prompted the seizure action itself or whether it came to the actors in the course of their action.

The first idea: it was necessary to put an end to what remained of the initial alliance between the Khomeyni revolution and the liberal bourgeoisie which Bazargan could be said to represent. That alliance had lasted as long as was required to destroy, through widespread anarchy and the exercise of power on two levels, the socioeconomic framework of the former society, a framework that had continued to exist even after the Shah's departure.

The second idea: it was now necessary to move on to the reconstruction phase, the reconstruction of a radically new regime that could be built, not on the Koran which offers no base whatever and for a very good reason, but solely on the base offered by the only model which is an alternative to the liberal model, namely the socialist model. And that base is anti-imperialism whose concrete form in this case is anti-Americanism. This is what accounts for the apparent "miracle" that has caused Khomeyni, whose anticommunism is not merely apparent but is very real, to no longer be indirectly approved in a relatively neutral and reserved manner by the pro-Soviet socialist world, but to now be directly acclaimed and vigorously supported as the champion of "national independence" and "anti-imperialism."

Reading L'HUMANITE and the Soviet press this past week has been most convincing in this respect, even if the Soviet Union, as a state, could not, in the United Nations, avoid deploring the taking of diplomats as hostages. For example, on 12 November, L'HUMANITE reported: "The demand for independence is asserting itself more intensely every day in Iran where the struggle

against imperialism remains the prime mover of the revolution." This idea was translated into concrete language, and indeed perhaps in a somewhat venturesome manner, by Foreign Minister Bani Sadr: "Believe me, the USSR would not remain neutral in the event of military aggression against Iran" (LE MONDE, 14 November).

Such is the "anchor" to what so frequently seems absurd to observers who are too set in the ways of their mechanical logic. I refer to the political convergence and the alliance between "frenzied" anticommunists and the international communist movement. Admittedly this convergence or this alliance is and will remain rather fragile as long as the anticommunist component is not done away with. I am not saying that in Brezhnev's view there is no real difference between Khomeyni and Pham Van Dong. Sometimes the anti-communist component ends up ruining the alliance in a situation where the anti-imperialist component is no longer sufficient to justify that alliance. Such was the case with Nasserism.

But sometimes too the alliance ends up toning down the most rabid anticommunism and becomes stabilized. Such was the case with Qadhdhafi and his conversion to a bizarre type of "Libyan socialism." Such was the case with Boumediene and his conversion to a kind of socialism less ludicrous than the preceding one and almost limited to a state military bureaucracy. Such was the case with Castro in his gradual submission to pure and simple communist orthodoxy.

Soviet Strategy in Iran

Paris LE FIGARO in French 26 Nov 79 p 32

[Article by Annie Kriegel: "Iran: Keys for a Revolution"]

[Text] The taking of hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran is the end result of a remarkably contrived operation whose real objective was to move Iran successfully into the second stage of the revolutionary process, and to do this "economically," in other words, "peacefully."

Under these conditions, it is understandable that the captors may "concede" to release the hostages whose seizure was never any more than instrumental and meant solely to permit achieving the results that have actually been obtained. Continued detention or slaughter of the hostages would now risk compromising these results. We cannot, of course, theoretically exclude the possibility of the execution of one or two hostages by captors enraged at the release of their prisoners, or by uncontrolled persons who would not have understood the imperatives of a program justified by the necessities of the science of revolution. But such apprehension is based on the idea that the embassy incident was produced by "spontaneous generation," by an outburst of frenzy at the height of a sort of "May 1968" relived by fanatics, and that these "students" think and act as they please with nobody having any real control over them.

Such an assumption is almost ridiculous. Even though we are far from having any detailed knowledge of the ins and outs of the operation, a person has to have a large amount of naive confidence in the "spontaneousness of the masses" to view the whole occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran as an Iranian equivalent of the occupation of the Sorbonne by the harebrained Cohn-Bendit.

Toppling All of Iran

The truth is that the incident thus created did, in fact, imply preliminary decisions and choices at the very highest level. The Soviet Union first had to decide to switch from a minimum objective to a maximum objective. Incidentally, a few weeks ago, I wrote, in this column, that it was up to the Soviet Union "to get into the act" after a period of necessary discretion, a period long enough to allow for completion of the breakup of the governmental and power structures of the former Iranian society.

The Soviet Union's minimum objective was to retrieve Stalin's only stinging defeat in the immediate post-World War II period when he had to abandon his hope of incorporating the Iranian provinces of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan into his empire as two new "Soviet republics." The Soviet Union felt that by supporting the demands of autonomists and separatists in defiance of the Persian government, even Khomeyni's government, it might be able to obtain, at the expense of the imperial entity, a limited but clear success in the northern provinces. Hence the period of acute tension between the Kurds and Khomeyni last spring and summer.

The maximum objective is not only to retrieve the Stalinist defeat but to go even further by neutralizing and then toppling all of Iran. The fact that the Kurds have just recently rallied to Khomeyni's now "anti-imperialist" venture is evidence that the maximum objective is definitely the current objective.

No Direct Intervention

It goes without saying, that this in no way means that at this stage the Soviet Union has to move up onto the front line and take direct frontal action, especially military action.

Nor does it mean that the Soviet Union would like to see Iranian-American tension per se degenerate into open war. Economic war would be sufficient. Communists in general and the Soviets in particular have no tendency to view war, even a "just" war, as purifying or regenerating. For them, the 30-year war in Vietnam is not the most ingenious model for the expansion of socialism.

The Soviets then had to consider that the time had arrived when it was possible to consummate the collapse of the alliance established 6 months

ago, an alliance uniting in so-so fashion the reformist, liberal, and moderate upper and lower middle classes grouped behind Bazargan and the underprivileged working masses rallied round Khomeyni's Islamic banner.

The Anti-Imperialist Second Wave

Last but not least, it was necessary to define a shock-producing incident sufficiently spectacular but still sufficiently meaningful to permit setting off a second wave that would rouse the Iranian masses as intensely as last winter's first wave had done, but a second wave rousing them in a cause that, this time, would no longer be essentially religious--Allah akhbar--but primarily political: "Down with American anti-imperialism." The new alliance between Islamic and Marxist populists would be formed in the wake of this "anti-imperialist" second wave. Yet it would not be simply a new alliance but also an alliance whose "common program" would fully conform to the Marxist--or rather Leninist, to be strictly exact--view of the world, a view whose central governing concept is known to be imperialism.

The plan outlined above has been implemented and well implemented.

What should we deduce from all this? First of all, that highly effective use has once again been made of all the pretexts and ruses designed to mislead world opinion and make it lose sight of what is really happening. One of the most successful of all the pretexts employed is the "gadget" of "the Islamic revival" coupled with reflections on "religious fanaticism," "Koranic fundamentalism," and "irrationalism." It should be no surprise to find that such a powerful event has a religious dimension in an area of culture and civilization where the process of secularization has barely begun.

This must not hide the fact, however, that the specifically religious dimension is already secondary. Proof of this? The rapprochement with Sovietized Afghanistan, a country that only a few months ago Khomeyni was still holding up to the Moslem rebellion's public scorn. As a matter of fact, the Ayatollah Khomeyni's "providential" role is now very close to being spent, even though there is no need to put an end to it by a coup which would be at least premature and probably superfluous. Having been spoliated by the "white revolution" of the Shah--who perhaps acted unwisely in this matter--the Shiite church was a ready-made mass--like the "nobiliary reactionary attitude" in pre-revolutionary France of 1788--with which to overthrow the Pahlavi regime in the name of a nebulous dream of fundamentalist restoration combined with some very powerful clerical appetites. Having finally "put the revolution back on its anti-imperialist feet" as it were, there is no reason for the Marxists to quarrel with Khomeyni unless he eventually rejects "anti-imperialism." Yet any attempt to compare Khomeyni to Gandhi, as Jean Daniel has done, is far-fetched: Khomeyni's anti-imperialism has none of the authenticity that was Gandhi's distinctive mark.

Diversiory Maneuvers

And what about the stray sparks of revolt in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, sparks that also bear evidence of that "religious fanaticism"? It is too early to assess their consistency. We cannot help but suspect, however, that these are "diversions," spontaneous or not. Who does not recall how the Soviets consolidated their hold over Central Europe at the beginning of the 1950's, shielded from any prying eyes, the latter being riveted on the turbulent spectacles in Western Europe and notably in France?

What else can we deduce from this situation? That the deceptive power of deceptive cognates is still as dangerously effective as ever. The life and death of hostages are flesh and blood realities each with its own distinctive face. Diplomatic immunity is a thoroughly defined rule of law that conditions the most routine aspects, the very realities of international life. Yet all of these realities are scornfully rejected by communists as being mere "form," apparent and superficial. If such is the case, what does constitute "substance"? That substance is "independence" and "the struggle against imperialism." These are two "open sesame" words, spell-binding and ambiguous catchwords whose meaning in this case is fixed according to the communist ideology. Hence in communist terminology Czechoslovakia and Angola are independent states while France must, according to an appeal issued by Georges Marchais, "struggle for its national independence" and Iran must "gain its independence." In short, "independence" is determined not by criteria defining the exercise of sovereignty but by membership in the socialist camp.

Standard Stalinist Arguments

For that reason it is quite futile, in my opinion, to scrutinize such American moves as the Shah's admission to a New York hospital in an effort to assess whether the U.S. Government was not imprudent or frivolous. Any other move would have done just as well. Similarly, Andre Fontaine's comments (in the 22 November LE MONDE) on the partially justified, if not legitimate, "hatred of America" are very flimsy. The frenzy of those mobs shouting "Go home"! is not prompted by any visceral anti-Americanism of the people. What is visceral is rather the fascination of America, because that great country, where millions of poor transplanted men and women were able to create very quickly a prosperous and free society, remains, no matter what may be said about it, a poor man's dream come true and the dream of those who are still poor.

Anti-Americanism is, therefore, merely the current version of anti-imperialism and its tenor does not depend on the possible faults or crimes of the real America. Moreover, this fact explains that rather strange attempt made by Iran--the cradle of Indo-Europeans (the whitest of the white!)--to divide and pit American Blacks against American Whites by releasing the Black American hostages and calling upon American Blacks to revolt. Is this a

"wild idea" of the "Islamic students" or of Khomeyni? No, it is simply a revival of the standard Stalinist arguments which in the 1930's had compelled the American Communist Party to consider the American Blacks as "a people" struggling for its "national independence" against "Yankee imperialism." These arguments were, in fact, revived for a time during the 1960's. Now we see them being advanced once again in Tehran.

8041

CSO: 4900

MORE U.S. EMBASSY DOCUMENTS REVEAL SECRETS

Staff Contacts With Locals

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Dec 79 p 2

[Text] The Islamic students, followers of the Imam occupying the American nest of spies have issued their 16th revealing statement. It exposes what the criminal United States had been doing in Iran, from where and which sources it received its information and to whom they were given. In addition, after the revolution, it was revealed how the treacherous Shah's dreaded SAVAK gathered its information from its network of informers throughout the country. As it [SAVAK] was the hand-made product of the world-devouring United States imperialism and the CIA, it became well-known that the American Embassy, this spy center of the CIA, had, in cooperation with the SAVAK, its own spy center and informers and various other sources of intelligence, collected information and passed it quickly to the embassy. These people were treacherous mercenaries serving foreigners against the Moslem people of Iran. These elements, facing the fisted arms and determination of our struggling people, have retreated, but not completely wiped out. The following document reveals the relations that existed among the network and the spies with the embassy. Here is the text:

From the United States Embassy to Washington, D.C. Confidential.

Subject: The Loss of Embassy's Sources of Information.

1. The entire subject is confidential.
2. In brief, the end result of the deterioration of the U.S.-Iranian relations has been the lessening of the desire of Iranians to meet with the embassy staff. This problem, as was noted in previous communications, is

getting more serious. Continuous pressure in connection with the appointment of Cutler as U.S. ambassador and the ever continuous charges of the U.S.-CIA interference in Iran have helped increase Iranians' fear of talking to or being seen with the embassy staff to a point which will destroy all our efforts in collecting intelligence.

3. One of the grave consequences of the deterioration in U.S.-Iranian relations has been the disappearance of our best sources of information. It has also resulted in making many Iranians reluctant to talk or to be seen with embassy staff. These started with the 7 May Senate condemnation of the execution by the Revolutionary Courts which was followed by demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 22 and 26 May and culminated in the extensive reflection of Yazdi's views in the press and the increased attacks on the U.S. by the media. All these have made our position more shaky and even worse than it used to be at the beginning of the revolution.

4. A staff member in the economic section, with four years of experience, reports that many Iranians who used to meet with him in his office or gave answers to his requests over the telephone now could at the most, be contacted for an appointment or reached by telephone at night. They now are reluctant to talk about issues which they discussed freely some six or eight months ago. There are a number of people who, because of warm and close relations [in the past], feel embarrassed at not keeping their regular and business appointments with us and they continuously try to postpone them. A Persian speaking employee of the oil company who has had three years of training [sic] has reported about problems he has had because of his extensive contacts with us. Some people no longer have access to sources of information which they had in the past and almost all of them are reluctant to talk to us.

5. All the staff members in the political section of the embassy have had the same experience. Some of our intelligence sources have left the country and even those who have had close and friendly relations with members of the political section for four years, now are not showing willingness to meet with us. Although there are some who are still willing to meet with embassy personnel at their homes. There are, of course, individuals who still meet with members of our political section but their number is not sufficient and are not the ones we would like to contact. Staff members who have been in Tehran even longer have noticed this reaction even from their old friends.

6. Our charge d'affaires reports with regard to a number of former Iranian ambassadors with whom he had been in touch, that none have contacted us after their return to Tehran. A retired ambassador told a political section staff member that many of his colleagues consider contacting the embassy as a highly dangerous venture in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We must now wait and see how many Iranians will be cooperating with us after those who have been working with us leave the country next month.

7. Our past experience indicates that one of our best sources of information were the Jewish Iranians. However, when we looked for sources of information they all were concerned about grave consequences if contacted by the U.S. [embassy].

8. A number of intelligence sources in Tehran have indicated that the suspicion of their colleagues and friends had increased. This is more true at university campuses where militants have been attacking intellectuals from an anti-American position. As a result, this group [intellectuals] and even those who are more aware of the current situation, are disappearing from the scene.

9. No doubt, in such circumstances collecting of intelligence needed by us becomes more difficult. Conditions have not yet reached the point where, as in some Third World nations, contacts between the embassy staff and the people is under strict control. However, pressure in recent weeks has moved Iran toward that direction.

The above-mentioned document reflects and confirms the existence of a United States intelligence and spy network in Iran. One wonders if those who are living in Washington, especially Mr. Carter, still refuse to admit that this [U.S. embassy in Tehran] was not a spy nest.

Moslem students, followers of the Imam.

Ties With Capitalists

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Dec 79 p 3

[Report: "Relations Between an Iranian Capitalist and United States' Nest of Spies"]

[Text] Following is the text of the document revealed by the students, followers of the Imam, that was broadcast two nights ago by radio and television. It reveals the relations between an Iranian capitalist and the not so United States. The text of the statement by the students, followers of the Imam, is as follows:

Following the document which was revealed to you, our dear people, we now expose another one which deals with a capitalist and the sucker of the blood of the underprivileged people, named Mehdi Rowghani. The text of the document is as follows: Document No. 1.

"A group of Mehdi Rowghani plan to form a large committee to act as liaison between the provisional government of Bazargan and Imam Khomeyni's committee. It is hoped that this could be accomplished by 10 March, 19 Esfand. Rowghani (a Khomeyni confidant) told the embassy's political officer, Stenple, [sic] on morning of 5 March that he, Mehdi Rowghani, had

spent the weekend in Qom and had been busy forming the committee which will try to harmonize relations between Bazargan's government and the Imam's committee. He said that as of 4 March, relations between the government and the Imam's committee had been badly strained and added that in several areas the committee ignored the government.

Rowghani is after forming a group made up of 100 people, broken down into units consisting of 8-10 people, who will be responsible for specific problems. Rowghani did not mention the names of these individuals, but said that the group consisted of reputable and influential elements from all areas of the revolutionary movement.

"The center of the liaison committee will be in Tehran. He said that the main goal of the committee was to draw the Imam's committee to a position so that it would adopt a more cooperative attitude toward the government. He hoped to go to Qom on 18 and 19 Esfand [10 and 11 March] to complete the arrangement. He also said that the Imam approved of this idea and talks with the government of Bazargan were in process. He was asked by a political officer if the forming of another committee would be helpful in solving some problems? Rowghani, who apparently was unhappy about the lack of law and order in the first three weeks after the revolution, said he was very hopeful and that something had to be done."

Note: At the end of his report to Washington about the meeting, the political officer remarks that Rowghani's application for a business visa to go to the United States indicated long-term benefits from him.

Following is the text of another document: Confidential.

May, 1979. From the American Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Subject: Meeting With Rowghani. Strictly confidential.

"Rowghani left for the United States this morning for a six to eight week visit. 'Bluff' gave him 'Precht's' name and telephone number and urged him to get in touch with 'Precht.' Rowghani had asked 'Bluff' if there were people he should meet. Rowghani is willing to meet 'Precht' and probably would be willing to hold secret talks with others as well. Because of his family ties with Imam Khomeyni he could be an important source of information about people surrounding Khomeyni."

Signed [no name given]

Document 3, Regarding connections with Mehdi Rowghani. From the United States embassy, Tehran to the State Department, Washington. Subject: Mehdi Rowghani.

With the possibility of being accused of pessimism we would like to indicate that Rowghani's optimism has grown in relation to his distance from Iran. In May, when he left for four to six weeks, he was very much disturbed about conditions in Qom and was not quite sure what had gone wrong with the revolution.

4 [sic]. If conditions have changed why does he need a "ken card" [green card?] or a citizenship card. In one of the Persian-language newspapers we came across a news item which indicated that he had fled the country one month ago. Refer to problems with Ford Co. in London. A copy was sent to the Department for its information. A report on Rowghani's position had been submitted. Ford had reported that basic problems had been settled. Normalization of relations, of course, could be expected through bureaucratic processes. We cannot confirm if progress was made. Rowghani is in the United States and Ford's Iranian lawyer is temporarily out of Iran. Signed: American Charge D'Affairs in Iran, Laingen.

Document 4, Regarding connections with Mehdi Rowghani.
From American embassy, Tehran to the Department of State, Washington, D.C.
Classification: confidential.

Subject: Complaint about Commercial Affairs.

1. The following letter of complaint on commercial affairs from Mehdi Rowghani has been received by the American embassy: Mehdi Rowghani's father was the person who kept Khomeyni in his house for 15 days before he was exiled in 1963 that is 1343. Therefore, Rowghani's family members have close ties with Khomeyni and his close associates. Mehdi Rowghani himself was instrumental in assisting the embassy in securing the release of U.S. marine S.J.T. Krise [sic]. The marine had been imprisoned for seven days following the attack on U.S. embassy on 14 February, 25 Bahman. Therefore, immediate action with regard to his complaint will be greatly appreciated.

2. Rowghani's family is the agent for the sale of Ford Company cars in Iran for the next 25 years. During an October 66 meeting in London Ford Company has agreed to pay Mr. Rowghani a four percent commission for all cars sold outside Iran and then taken into the country. Following the agreement Ford Company had requested and apparently received information about cars inside the country. The report was examined twice by Ford. There are about 1,500 such cars involved and we reached an agreement about the amount to be paid to Rowghani. In the year 1357 (1978-79), a Ford company representative after twice examining the report on the existing cars in Iran, the payment of commission on 1,500 cars to Rowghani was promised. Mr. Rowghani would like to know when is the Ford Company going to pay him. The liaison in London is Deputy Middle East and African Operation Chief, Roder Benifice [sic].

3. For London. When answering please inform the Department [of State]. On the basis of information determined in London contact and correspondence with the Department may or may not be proper [sic].

4. In addition to the commission problem, Rowghani has another difference with the Ford Company which concerns the sale of some 60 heavy trucks to the Iranian National Oil Company. He claims that the difference between the

export price and the sale price to the oil company should be paid to him as the agent of the company. The oil company has paid for the purchase directly to the Ford Company. He believes he should be compensated. This problem is four years old and is still dragging. Any information provided with regard to the Ford Company's position and their willingness to pay and clear the account will be greatly appreciated. Signed: Sullivan.

Note: The man called Stenple [sic] is a well-known agent of the dreaded CIA.

Attention should now be paid to the Imam's statement in which he said that these westernized intellectuals are the ones that will cause our revolution to deviate from its course. By publishing these two documents we have exposed the attitude of the western-inclined intellectuals and the capitalists, the two elements who would like to bring the United States back to our country. They favor the Western rule of Iran. Our nation will no longer be fooled by these intellectuals and capitalists who call for compromise with the United States. They are condemned by our people. Our people are alert and intend to uproot these elements of corruption and do away with the American bases of power in our country.

9561

CSO: 4906

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

URANIUM PRODUCTION--Tel Aviv Dec 21: Israel will next year start producing uranium for power plants, Eliahou Teoumin, Managing Director of the Negev Phosphates Company Chemicals, Israel said today. It has reserves of 40,000 tons enough to supply eight to 10 one-megawatt nuclear reactors for several dozen years, he said. The 0.1 to 0.2 percent uranium content in the Dead Sea and Negev phosphate deposits is insufficient to justify direct extraction. But extraction is commercially worthwhile as part of fertilizer, acid and phosphate derivate extraction he said.--AFP [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 22 Dec 79 p 8]

CSO: 4820

BASHIR AL-JUMAYYIL EXPLORES POSSIBILITIES OF SOLUTION TO COUNTRY'S CRISIS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 26 Nov-2 Dec 79 pp 10-15

[Interview With Bashir al-Jumayyil, Chairman of Lebanese Forces Military Council, by Ilyas al-Dayri and May Kahhalah; "This Legitimacy [Legitimate Government] Cannot Achieve Any Detente; I Don't Believe That There Will Another War in Future; Who Will Fight Whom; I Defy Walid Junblatt to Agree to Meet With Me; I Am Ready to Go to Him Wherever He Wants and Ready to Meet Ibrahim Qulaylat and All; For First 3 Months, We Fought With 30 Rifles We Purchased From Palestinians; We Had Fear of Lebanese Muslim But Now We have Freed Ourselves of This Complex So Welcome to Muslims in al-Ashrafiyah and in All Our Areas; President Sarkis Must Be Convinced That Forces on Stage Are Ones That Can Close Ports, Control Violations and Administer Justice"]

[Text] "There will be no war after now but the intellectual terror insists on putting the country in this charged atmosphere. The state is weak and it must seek the help of the actual forces on the stage. I want to reach an understanding with the state to put an end to the wave of crime and chaos. Legitimacy [legitimate government] is a point of meeting among all the parties concerned. We are studying a common denominator and practical cooperation with the state. I address this appeal to my brother the Lebanese Muslim: I am a sword in your hand and I am not against you." These are the words Bashir al-Jumayyil, the chairman of the Lebanese Military Council, uttered in his interview with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI.

[Question] Let us start with the Lebanese war. The war climate is still prevalent and Lebanon is still suffering under the burden of its consequences. Why did this war occur, what good has it done us and where do we now stand in comparison to where we were before the war?

[Answer] When the war started, none of us knew where it would reach and what its consequences would be. I remember that in the Phalanges Security Council we had 30 (Slavia)rifles which we had purchased from the Palestinians. During the first 3 months of the war, we fought with those 30 rifles. Can it be still said that we are the ones who imposed the war? They are the ones who imposed it. They forced us to fight and we fought.

[Question] You always repeat "they imposed the war." Who are "they?" What state, what faction, what side?

[Answer] I don't want to again talk about plots, agreements and issues of the sort. The war was imposed and its factors were numerous. It so coincided that the Lebanese soil was mobilized politically and socially. We must focus in this interview on the social aspect which will constitute a considerable part of our battle. It is not essential that the battle be a military or a political battle because we have today a social crisis that is more serious than any other crisis. It is possible that national unity will be achieved through the social crisis whose whirlwind we have begun to enter. This crisis is more serious than any military battle.

[Question] We will not say that there are factions. There are big, ramified and common international factors that have no objection to Lebanon staying as it is now or even to Lebanon disappearing.

[Answer] They will have rest and we will thus solve a large part of the crisis.

Not Us and not President

[Question] We, therefore, ask this question: What do the Phalanges actually have, other than emotional and amicable words, to offer and to implement for the restoration of this country?

[Answer] I don't know if I have the right to speak in the party's name. Buy my answer, and perhaps it is the feeling of everybody in the Phalanges and in the National Front, is that we are under occupation in the full sense of the word.

You ask what, other than nice words, we can offer. These words are necessary because we will one day return and reap their fruits. These words prepare for a certain climate after the elimination of occupation. We may not be capable at present, and nobody is. Even President Ilyas Sarkis is not able to realize the national unity. The legitimate government to which they deliver military vehicles, jeeps and trucks and with which they write statements and offer verbal support--even this legitimate government is not able to achieve any detente.

It is my opinion that talking about detente at present is like deceiving ourselves. The Muslim faction is eager to return to its previous Lebanese roots because it has suffered the worst of evils and because it has found out where its experiment has led it. The Lebanese Muslim has begun to feel now that his position is different from that of the Muslims of any other country. Even the personality of the Lebanese Muslim is distinct from that of any other Arab Muslim. The Lebanese Muslim has now begun to be aware of this.

What we are thinking of practically at present is to be prepared when the Syrian occupation disappears, and it must disappear. We are no longer trapped because the countdown has started and Syria will not stay long among us. So, the practical thing for us is to stand fast, as we did in the summer of 1978, i.e. to preserve a part of Lebanon free--not only for the Christian community but for the Lebanese society as a whole--where the Christian and the Muslim communities can see that this resistance has been for the sake of all of Lebanon and the sake of all the Lebanese factions and where these communities can see that any Lebanese can benefit from the resistance of al-Ashrafiyah and 'Ayn al-Rummanah.

This resistance has succeeded whereas the Syrian control of Lebanon or of the free areas constituting the starting point for the liberation of al-Bastah, the south, 'Akkar and al-Biqa' has failed.

We can now see what is happening in Burj al-Barajinah and al-Shiyah. A Syrian patrol passed under a Shi'ite woman sitting on the balcony of her house and the woman hurled at the patrol a flower pot that "split open" the head of a Syrian soldier. This woman is not Marunite, isolationist or an agent of Israel. This means that we hope that our resistance in al-Ashrafiyah will expand. The practical thing that the Phalanges are offering is to preserve the spirit of resistance so that when Syria withdraws from our country under the impact of events or developments which we do not know, Lebanon will move in order that we may establish detente and that President Sarkis may perform his role. Even if he doesn't wish to do so, we as a people will be prepared to perform this role, having gained sufficient maturity and a sufficient sense of responsibility. At that time the Phalanges, along with the other factions, will call for a roundtable or for a national conference. And we must agree.

Lebanese State Will not Do It

[Question] But to reach this result or this solution, we must have two things: A state capable of saying to the Syrian "thank you for your cooperation and services" and then to take charge of affairs. This state cannot exist as long as you have your separate state and as long as you don't recognize the legitimate state.

[Answer] No, no. I object to both projections. I object to the first because the state is no longer required to tell Syria: Go. The state is no longer required to do so because, first, the State of Lebanon will not do it for numerous considerations and, second, because Syria is not here with our approval but acts as an occupation army. The proof is the offhanded arrests which are the basic characteristic of any occupier. An occupier can collect funds and protection money, can levy taxes on plants and can dissemble them, as states did in World War II.

The basic characteristic [of any occupier] are the haphazardly arrests. Look at the shaykhs that they have arrested and who do not know whether they will come back or not or look at our people who have been detained in Syria for 16 months and with whom we have lost all communication and about whom we know nothing. There are things imposed by the Syrian on the army, on the public security, on the judiciary and on all the state agencies. This is why the state is incapable of asking the Syrians to leave.

Comprehension and Smashing

[Question] But if you give the state power, if you let it get strong and if you help it...

[Answer] I beg your pardon. If the State of Lebanon tells the Syrians to leave, a small army detachment will be sent to B'abda Palace or to al-Yarzah and will throw everybody out. Such an act has become ordinary. Historically, the examples are numerous. France under the occupation was in a similar position and (Beitan) was not required to tell the Germans: Go. We must not [sic] view these issues from a different angle because the State of Lebanon is incapable of expelling the Syrian. You also say that the State of Lebanon will grow strong if I give it its strength [sic]. Here permit me to say that we all know that when President Sarkis was elected in 1976 Pierre al-Jumayyil compelled all the party deputies to go under fire to vote for President Sarkis. Pierre al-Jumayyil was able to persuade ex-President Camille Sham'un to elect Sarkis as president of the republic. I was the middleman who conveyed Shaykh Pierre's message to ex-President Sham'un to come to the council [Chamber of Deputies]. We opened all the possibilities and gave the state all the means at the beginning of 1976 so that it may "take off" and regain all its positions and strength. Regrettably, the state was living in the climate of 1958 and as if nothing had happened. It was living in the climate of indifference of the 3 years of the war.

Thus, I was compelled to go along with the state and to surrender all my resources to the ministers who ruled us in the first 3 years. At the same time, we were forced to act as an authority or with some of the legitimate government's powers to preserve some of the accomplishments made and also to preserve our position and entity. But instead of understanding all the effective forces on the stage, the state tried to smash them. This is where the dispute erupted between the state and the forces that considered themselves no longer committed to the state for any thing.

We tell the state: Do not ask us to give you everything on a silver plate. The state must take these powers away from us and if it fails, we are not responsible.

Sarkis Is to Blame!

[Question] We are not talking about the legal powers nor about the legitimacy of the Syrian presence. However, from your point of approach, how can the homeland be liberated and regained when the legitimate Lebanese government, represented now by Ilyas Sarkis, does not give your resistance or the resistance of any other faction the benefit of legitimacy and of constitutionality?

[Answer] Right.

[Question] If you give the state strength, you would be giving this strength to the homeland. So if Sarkis tells the Syrians to leave and they fail to do so, then he can create an international crisis. But how can Sarkis say this [tell Syrians to go] when he does not have control even over a single police post?

[Answer] He is to blame because instead of building a modern army in every sense of the world in the first 3 years, he smashed the remnants of the Lebanese army. Instead of showing respect to the officers who fought for a cause, who never asked about their salaries and who sacrificed everything, Sarkis and the army command resorted to breaking those officers (here Bashir mentioned the names of some officers). They broke these officers instead of giving them an opportunity with officers from the other faction. I am not demanding a factional army or an army that belongs to one faction. Let them rely on the persons who fought for a cause and who performed the duty of blood, not on television but on the soil. President Sarkis committed a mistake when he thought that by breaking these elements he can build an army. Now Sarkis has reached a situation where the army is nonexistent. Some ambassadors persuaded Sarkis that what he was doing was great. There were parades on television but at the first tremor, his army splintered in the port and in "Uyun al-Siman.

Free by 180 Degrees

[Question] Even if the state responds to what you are asking it for we would not achieve anything because we are emerging from a bloody war and Sarkis cannot gather people tainted with blood and who were enemies in a civil war and form an army and a state with such people.

[Answer] This is the mistake in the thinking of President Sarkis, of some ambassadors and of those who are in charge of Lebanese affairs. They were mistaken when they thought that rearranging the Lebanese situation comes through ousting the groups present on the arena. They committed a mistake when they started to classify the opponents as moderate and radical elements, describing this as a fighter and that as somebody who creates sensitivities and saying that we must rely on persons who represent nothing so as to avoid

sensitivities. Here I say that it is a million times easier for you to reach an understanding with a person who knows what he wants and is capable of carrying out what he wants than to reach an understanding with a person who doesn't know what he wants and incapable of carrying out something on which you agree with him.

[Question] Why didn't you agree to a cabinet representing all the opponents?

[Answer] We did not accept? Who vetoed it?

[Question] All the opponents vetoed each other.

[Answer] Why, who does Talal al-Mar'ibi represent? And does Salim al-Huss represent me?

Abu-Hasan and National Movement

[Question] We see that there are the Lebanese Front parties on this side and the National Front parties on the other side.

[Answer] Abu-Hasan used to tell me that there is no such a thing as a National Movement but there is a Palestinian resistance with a screen called the National Movement.

[Question] They say that Israel is behind the Lebanese Front and if each faction continues to cling to his part we will need a miracle to regain the country and the legitimate government. But practically, we are doing nothing to save the country that can endure no more dragging and no more heroics. The practical thing...

[Answer] Yes, we took the initiative to do the practical thing. I visited Kamal Junblatt.

[Question] That was in the past. What prevents you from meeting Walid Junblatt now?

[Answer] I defy Walid Junblatt to agree to meet with us. I invite him to a meeting and I am ready to go wherever he wants or wishes. I defy him to accept.

[Question] Why don't you meet Ibrahim Qulaylat? Have you tried to establish bridges with the Shi'ite leaders and with the Sunni leaders?

[Answer] The bridges are numerous but they are timid because the person who will hold a dialogue with us today is exposed to assassination at any moment as a result of the occupation under which such a person lives.

[Question] This is said to be because of your relationship...

[Answer] With Israel. This story has become like that of the oil jar. This is a pretext. I am not the ally of anybody. I am the ally of my cause.

At one time we were compelled to cooperate with those who were able to help us. When Abu-Iyad believed that the path to Haifa passed to Junyah, what option did we have before us?

[Question] What limit did this cooperation with or help from the "devil" into which you were forced reach?

[Answer] I will not say that I cooperated with the "devil." We cooperate with whoever agrees to help us, regardless of who he is.

[Question] To what degree can Israel commit you to any decision?

[Answer] I am free in my actions by 180 degrees. We are free and we work for our interests as Lebanese. When our interest requires cooperation with this or that, then we do so. When our interest requires us to fight so or so, then we fight him. We are not committed or tied to anybody. We are Lebanese and free and we wish the entire world had the degree of freedom that we have.

We Want All of Lebanon

[Question] It is said, and only you have the proof, that Shaykh Bashir is the leader of the cooperation with Israel because he has a visualization for a specific Lebanon and because he accepts nothing but the Lebanon of Bashir al-Jumayyil personally.

[Answer] Right. I want this Lebanon whose borders [contain within them] 10,425 square kilometers.

[Question] They say you want less.

[Answer] Less! When you read some newspapers that abound with fabrications and you listen to some radios that are well-known for their inclinations, how do you want the Muslim public opinion not to "believe" all that is said, especially when what is said is groundless. They fabricate news. One time they bring Sa'd Haddad to Junyah and another they have me meeting with Begin in Israel. Every day, hirelings fabricate these stories and, naturally, the Muslim public opinion is affected by them. I address to the Muslim public opinion and tell it that everything it hears and everything that some people try to ingrain in its mind is wrong. The Lebanon that we want has an area of 10,425 square kilometers and it is a Lebanon for the Muslim and the Christian, but within a certain constitutional framework that spares them and spares us another massacre like the one we have gone through. Is there anything to be said about this?

[Question] What is said about your wanting a Christian Lebanon or a Phalangist Lebanon is reinforced by a fact emanating from the war, namely the fact that the Phalanges have clashed even with their allies and it has appeared that they have tried to reduce the weight of all their opponents so that they may impose themselves as the sole power on the Lebanese stage.

[Answer] Do you think that we can reduce the weight of Camille Sham'un?

[Question] You have clashed with Sham'un, with Franjiyah, with the Armenians and with others and it seemed as if you, as the Phalanges Party and as Bashir al-Jumayyil, want your own state.

[Answer] At the end of a war like the one we have gone through, the clashes could have been more crushing and bloodier, especially since there is no state, no army and no police. There was a popular war and weapons were in the hands of people in an unimaginable way. There were individual interests on the part of many in this faction and the other faction. I do not deny these clashes and we are all pained by them. However, we and ex-President Sham'un are a single hand to solve all that has happened.

[Question] The question is: Does Bashir al-Jumayyil have a plan to set up his own state?

[Answer] Do you believe that this state can come into existence by destroying all the existing institutions? Impossible. The clash with the Armenians started because of a trivial matter and we needed 2 days before we could settle it. But ultimately, we and the Armenians restored our previous relations. We have political objections against the Armenians that go back earlier than 1975. These issues must be dealt with and we are dealing with them. We have held several meetings with the social leaderships and we will very shortly come up with a unified working paper so that we may feel a stronger organic unity than before.

[Question] What is the basis?

[Answer] I prefer not to speak now because we are in the heart of the negotiations with the Armenians. After nearly 2 weeks, we will emerge with something unified which, I hope, will end the dispute finally.

State! Can We?

[Question] So you in the Phalanges Party don't want to set up your own state.

[Answer] Can the Phalanges Party set up a state? Where would we go with the other factions? Why are they trying to portray the matter in a manner that conflicts with the truth?

[Question] Because you have been eager in the Lebanese Front areas to keep a certain type of people. In al-Ashrafiyah, you rarely find a Muhammad, a Hasan, a Mustafa or a... [Muslims].

[Answer] Have you passed by Bayt Baydun Quarter and by al-Burjawi where there is a Druze concentration and in Karm al-Zaytun where there is a Shi'ite concentration. They remained there throughout the war, fought on our side and had martyrs fall from among them.

[Question] These are the ones who fought with you. But those who do not want to fight...

[Answer] We still have a Druze community and a Shi'ite community that remained among us.

[Question] These proofs don't deny that you have wanted an area where nobody other than you is present.

[Answer] Because at one time I had a fear complex.

[Question] And now?

[Answer] Now I have been freed of it.

[Question] Why don't you do something, for example, to let one third of the Muslims who were in al-Ashrafiyah return to it? This means that you have been freed but that the residues are still present among the fighters.

[Answer] I say that we, not as fighters but as a group of people living in this part of the free Lebanon, have freed ourselves of this complex. We now know that the Lebanese Muslim has come to cling to the entity like us. It has taken us 600 years to free ourselves of this complex. Now the Lebanese Muslim is supposed to return and consider these areas his own. The individual problems will persist and we will continue to be exposed to incidents of this kind here and there. This means that these issues will not be controlled in 24 hours with a magic wand. But now the leaderships are supposed to move closer to each other, to hold dialogue, not to insult each other and to inspire trust in the base on one part may mingle with the other.

Take, for example, Walid Junblatt's statement in Paris that Pierre al-Jumayyil is senile, that Sham'un is a ban'it and that I don't know what. Is it proper after 5 years of war to return to the expressions and methods followed before? Walid Junblatt is the chairman of a party speaking about the chairmen of

other parties who have their glorious history. These things complicate rather than facilitate. We, as leaders, are supposed to rise above these methods that do not befit a responsible and refined person and that do not facilitate the restoration of conditions to normalcy. We must be eager to reach understanding with each other. The Syrians will go one day and the Palestinians will become, and must become, disciplined. The Palestinian must know that he can no longer live in the chaos under which he has lived and that the red carpet that he is spreading in Europe will be riddled with holes and blown up as a result of a small problem with the Maronite or the Shi'ite in Lebanon.

Palestinian's Profits and Losses

[Question] And why are you excluding the Sunni?

[Answer] This is possible yet... the days will come. But the Palestinian must know that all the propaganda and diplomatic gains he is achieving in the west will disappear when he returns to faulty or irresponsible practices in Lebanon. This is why we, as Lebanese, must understand this. The Palestinian diplomatic openness to the west makes the Palestinian's cause more delicate and his position more critical and the Palestinian will not be able to do what he used to do previously. I hope that these words will reach the simple and ordinary Muslim: The driver, the grocer, the student and the family head, i.e. the true Muslim Lebanese conscience. My words are addressed to them and not to the leaderships that do not represent them. Samir Farnayjah does not represent the Islamic public opinion and neither do George Habash, George Hawi, Michel... It is preposterous that the real Islamic public opinion is represented by a group of Christians who have nothing to do with Islam.

As for the Islamic public opinion, it must rest assured that the resistance in which we have engaged has been in our name and in its name and that the liberated areas are for us and for it so that this public opinion may march forth and liberate its own areas. One day, the hour and the opportunity will come and this public opinion must be prepared to proceed with the act of liberation as we were in 1978 prepared to proceed with the act of liberating ourselves. National unity can be achieved from this angle. The true problems are not jobs and lies alone [sic]. Lebanon had been built on lies, on business and on interests of which we were proud in our financial and economic system. We used to say that the country was prosperous. This prosperity was built on lies, theft and cheating.

Now we must all understand that the true national unity will consist of participation in the responsibility. So far, we have been given the responsibility. But the day will come when the Lebanese Muslim will participate with us so that we may march forth together. We want the Lebanese Muslim to believe that any action we carry out is carried out in our name and his name. One day, he will see that all that has been done was done in Lebanon's name and not in the name of one faction for building the state of one party or of one faction.

[Question] But the Muslim is still very wary.

[Answer] I understand this.

[Question] What bolsters this wariness is that you were the one who accused the Muslim previously of having little allegiance for Lebanon, rather than this allegiance was nonexistent.

[Answer] And he admits that he was so at one time.

We Don't Trust Army

[Question] But it has now become evident that you, as a faction and not as a person, are not letting the homeland return to legitimacy by your preventing the state legitimacy and the state army from returning, to your area as long as you have no Syrians and no Palestinians among you.

[Answer] You are talking like Salim al-Huss. Is there still a spot in this small area of Lebanon in which the army doesn't exist? There are seven roadblocks between al-Madfun and this place. The army is in the center of al-Ashrafiyah and in all the areas.

[Question] But for every army roadblock there are two Phalangist roadblocks.

[Answer] This is another subject. However, it doesn't mean that the army is not present among us. But we do not trust the army. This is a television army and not a real army.

[Question] So you are saying that the army is nonexistent, even though there are no dangers in your area. What will the resident of al-Bastah and the resident of the south say? National unity cannot be restored through any militia other than the state militia.

[Answer] Okay, okay [said in English].

[Question] So, you must give the example by showing that the state militia can enter al-Ashrafiyah in order that we may ask it why it doesn't enter Sabra, for example.

[Answer] Let it enter. Am I or is Salim al-Huss preventing it?

[Question] Casting doubts prevents the army from entering.

[Answer] I don't accept this analysis. I refuse it because the Lebanese army hasn't received so far any backing and any support from anybody except us. The army entered Burj Rizq and it should have entered Burj al-Murr at the same time. The Palestinian resistance didn't allow it and Salim al-Huss agreed with the resistance on not permitting the army's entry to Burj al-Murr.

I don't trust in the Lebanese army at present because it is not in charge of any front. It did not come to 'Ayn al-Rummanah until after the events that we know. The Lebanese army is not in al-Zu'rur and not in any area where there is a front or tangential lines. The army is in our internal areas. Yet, we have accepted it. But we don't trust it because it has not been tested. We ask Salim al-Huss to permit the army to enter the markets [al-aswaq] front. We ask him to deploy the army in Fattal building and in the port, not on gate No 9 to watch for thefts, if there are any thefts, but on the first pier where the front is, in Ashmun building, in al-Tabaris and on the wall. Let the army enter al-Damur and al-'Ayshiyah. Why should it enter al-Ashrafiyah and not al-Dawshah or some other place? This is why we don't trust the army. Yet, it is present in our area.

I Say to Lebanese Muslim

[Question] But the others consider the "Deterrence" our army. Your position vis-a-vis the Syrians is clear but the Muslim believes that the Syrians defend him against you more strongly than the army.

[Answer] The Lebanese Muslim is still holding this position?

[Question] He still has the complex of fear of you.

[Answer] This fear is there because the Syrian and the Palestinian make the Lebanese Muslim think that if he comes to our area the Lebanese Forces, the Phalanges and Bashir al-Jumayyil will slaughter him. This is the pretext of the Syrian and of the Palestinian to secure their continued presence in Lebanon. Here I ask my Lebanese Muslim brother, stressing the request and twice underlining it with red, and tell him that throughout 43 years of joint coexistence, no similar incidents took place before the Palestinian and the Syrian came. The Lebanese Muslim must not believe this rumor and this propaganda. On the contrary, there has been a cliché for 5 years and the Lebanese Muslim has been reiterating it under the impact of the circumstances. We are doing all we can to free the Muslim of this cliché. I tell the Muslim: Bashir al-Jumayyil is a sword in your hand and not against you.

Green Light

[Question] It is possible that direct dialogue is the means.

[Answer] Will they be permitted to hold the dialogue? We had several indirect contacts with Walid Junblatt and the answer always was: "Brother, my father [Kamal Junblatt who was assassinated during the civil war] is enough." So why do they always accuse us of rejecting the dialogue? Go-betweens mediated between us and the Palestinians several times and the answer was: "Get the go-ahead signal from Syria and we are ready. Otherwise, we are sorry."

[Question] Abu-Iyad has opened the way and called for a dialogue.

[Answer] Abu-Iyad says the opposite of what he wants.

[Question] Why haven't you exploited the opportunity?

[Answer] We have exploited the opportunity. Abu-Iyad says something in the papers and when you get down to the real situation you find something different.

Social Crisis

[Question] Let us return to the real situation. Your state diminished greatly at one time. How can you give on this small spot the example for what you call the Lebanon of the future?

Regarding the small spot in which we are, large parts have stripped away, of course. But this does not intimidate us because the occupation has been military. The occupation of so many more or less square kilometers is no longer the problem. They can occupy land, buildings and soil as long as they have not occupied minds and hearts and as long as they have not broken the will to stand fast and the will to resist. They can occupy all the kilometers they want. What we are living under in Sinn al-Fil and al-Mukallas and up to the north, to 'Akkar, to western Beirut and to the mountain is occupation. All this is land occupation. 'Abd-al-Nasir occupied Yemen and ultimately the sands turned into a graveyard and he was in a hurry to get out of it. Every kilometer that the Syrian occupies nowadays causes him to be more and more deeply stuck in the Lebanese quagmire and sands. I don't think that this occupation scares us. The shrinkage of the land is not important. Naturally, the population density is an inconvenience and the enormous demographic pressure creates a social crisis to which we will come back. But nationally, the occupation of several more or less kilometers does not scare us.

As for the second part of the question, I would like to draw your attention to a social crisis that may touch off the entire situation. Take for example the problem of rent, the high cost of living, the inflation, the installment payments, all the essential commodities that we need, fuel and all the essentials that should occupy more of our attention than any other issue. The political issue is projected urgently and has the top priority. But the developments in the entire area, especially what has happened and is happening in Iran, can constitute to the Americans an event as important as Pearl

Harbor was in World War II--an event which changed all the criteria and all the alliances. Now, the Iranian action may be as important as Pearl Harbor and this brings up the issue of the international and Middle Eastern alliances anew. We are waiting for the developments to see what will happen at this level. Meanwhile, we have an internal problem and the Labor Federation will meet on the 26th of the month to study inflation.

Forty Three Years of Prosperity

[Question] This is the result of the political reality and the housing problem in al-Ashrafiyah cannot be solved without political solution. One thing follows the other.

[Answer] Yes, I accept this. At times I project the political crisis through the social crisis and tell all of Lebanon's workers and all the Lebanese to unite in the face of this social crisis. This perhaps is the gate to reorganize matters and affairs seriously. We used to say that the Lebanon of 1943 had died and that we buried it and we placed guard on its grave so that it may not rise again. Actually, what was the Lebanon that we buried? It was the Lebanon with the mentality of the merchant and the mentality of a country established on services.

[Question] But we have not buried it.

[Answer] If the responsibility of our generation and of our resistance is to build a new Lebanon, then I assert that this Lebanon [of 1943] will go. For 43 years of independence, we sang the praises of prosperity and of the country of services. Did those services enable us to build one good university? The universities existing at present and enjoying respect are the ones founded in the past century. We have not built a single Lebanese university in the full sense of the word. We have not learned to build good hospitals that offer good services. Services do not consist of our having a banking sector for smuggling and for cheating. Real services are services that we can offer to the entire area and we have not been able to do this.

Priority for Social Issues

[Question] All this is a matter of ethics. The war has exposed hidden Lebanese ethics. However, we tell Bashir al-Jumayyil: More than one incident has taken place in your area which you cannot accept even from somebody considered your supporter. Still, you have not taken any measure indicating that your era is better than the previous eras and that your state is better than the State of Lebanon at which you are angry. As you have fought for the piece of land, you must also fight for man. The problem is ethical primarily and you, like any dictator, must give the people examples and the people must be told: Look, this murderer is now standing against the wall [presumably to be executed].

[Answer] We did something of the sort a short time ago. Frankly, we fought hard to take this decision when three employees of the electricity company were attacked and killed and their money stolen by a colleague of theirs. At times, we still fight with ourselves for decisions toward which some people express their reservations on the grounds that we are not the state and not the legitimate government and that, therefore, we have no right to pass sentences. Temporarily and until the state regains its strength and as I have shouldered the responsibility of the war and of defending a certain concept of Lebanon, I must deal with issues that are not within my jurisdiction, such as setting up courts and approving sentences issued by agencies of the Lebanese Forces. Though illegal, this matter is no more legal than our having artillery weapons or armors in our possession. I believe that when facing a crisis, the party becomes more strongly inclined to get firmer control of the situation. The party's inclination does not, and I stress this point, emanate from the single-party theory or of the desire to impose partisan control on the crisis. But the party is studying the truth of the social crisis and of its causes so that we may start dealing with it. The priority must be given now to the social issues because this is what the people want. I know that young men are hesitant to get married because of the social hardships that they will face. There is no social security and there are no social laws that preserve society's integrity and this encourages theft and smuggling.

Let us take for example the issue of smuggling and of the ports. Can a state and a society respecting themselves agree to have all the Lebanese shoreline from Tyre to Tripoli containing piracy ports and the subsequent international and Arab reactions that Lebanon has to face because of these ports? All these issues need to be dealt with. As a party, we are studying these issues in a practical manner so as to present them to the state and to ask it to carry out its functions. If the state refuses, we can shoulder responsibilities.

[Question] As long as we make it a precondition that the state seal a port there before we close a port here, the issue will not end. If you have a criminal residing in the first floor of a building, would you deal with all the building residents on this basis? Why don't you close your ports and embarrass the state?

[Answer] I do not view matters from this angle. You want me to implement the principle of 6 and 6 repeated and to embarrass the state. Even if the ports here agree, the state is incapable of doing this. If I let the army enter Burj Rizq and al-Ashrafiyah, it will still not be able to enter Burj al-Murr and al-Bastah. The state is incapable of implementing the principle of 6 and 6 repeated because it only exists among us and because we agree to have it exist among us.

Look at the issue this way: The situation in Lebanon as a whole is abnormal. I take Lebanon with all its ports and all its territories and I say that the situation is abnormal. I believe that the solution lies in the participation of the actual forces on the arena in the decision, in the authority and in

implementation. Even if the state closes all the ports, there are still people who do not dare go to their homes. The problem is not here. The problem is in the fact that the state is nonexistent at the level of decision making and of implementation. The solution does not lie in my closing Junyah port and telling the state that I am good and then telling the ambassadors: Look what I have done, I am a moderate. The solution lies in our participating in the government. Then all the ports will be closed. This is what the regime does not comprehend. The principle of 6 and 6 repeated cannot be implemented at present.

So, the solution lies in actual participation in the responsibility. President Sarkis must be convinced that the forces on the arena are the forces that can close ports, control violations and administer justice. I repeat that there are no moderate elements and radical elements. There are elements who believe in their cause and who are capable of closing ports, administering justice and restoring Lebanon.

[Question] Will you not share the state's responsibilities unless you are in the government?

[Answer] This is not what I am saying. I am talking about what is asked of you when you are "on the outside." I don't want to be a minister or a deputy but a force on the stage.

Legitimacy for Militias

[Question] What, with utter clarity, do you want from this state so that it may be reflected positively on the homeland and on the situation?

[Answer] The formula is under study presently. We have made long strides insofar as this formula is concerned and I think that we will get there because after 3 years of no peace, no war and no government, the state has begun to feel that it is incapable of doing away with the forces present on the stage. After 3 years of resistance, we believe that we have reached a position that enables us to take part in the responsibilities. With this common denominator between us and the regime, we will move closer and closer toward it.

[Question] What is the common denominator practically? A new formula for Lebanon?

[Answer] The new formula for Lebanon is not the common denominator over which I and the regime will reach an understanding because this formula will consist of a national agreement among all the factions. My relations with the regime are more practical than patriotic. The formula is something between me and the other faction. The regime should stand neutral and act as a referee or should take my side because the president is from a certain group

and the prime minister is from another. I don't know how these positions will be coordinated. But I want an understanding with the state to put an end to the wave of crime, inflation and chaos. I will give them my legitimacy over the land and let them give me their legitimacy as a (force on the stage) and we can then participate in lightening the burdens carried by the citizen.

Legitimacy Is Point of Meeting

[Question] This means merging the militia in a certain national framework.

[Answer] This may be a solution. Or the militia can be given a legitimate role as a support force or we may disband it, provided that we get the guarantees that the army will defend us if 'Ayn al-Rummanah is exposed to another massacre like that of 13 April 1975.

[Question] But some say that the solution is not in one line. You and Sarkis cannot solve the problem, not even you, Walid Junblatt and Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din can do so.

[Answer] This is possible when the Syrian leaves.

[Question] But why should we oust the Syrian with the force of arms and not with a bouquet of roses?

[Answer] Because you don't know the Syrian.

[Question] At one time, there was a dialogue and a big alliance between Syria and the Lebanese Front. What prevents holding the dialogue anew?

[Answer] There is something constant in the Syrian rule, namely the Syrian desire for Lebanon. Any Syrian in power wants to dominate Lebanon and annex it to Syria.

[Question] Why, then, did you ask for them and bring them to this country?

[Answer] Are we the ones who did this or was it the result of Arab and international conditions?

[Question] But you gave the Syrians the legitimacy.

[Answer] The first thing I said was that when we started the war, our leaders did not know where we would get. We later found that there were things that should not have happened.

[Question] But you are responsible because you have appointed yourself.

[Answer] Not at all. I was in my office and was compelled to descend [to the stage] against my will. If you want my place, you are welcome to it.

[Question] But you accepted the task and so you are responsible.

[Answer] Of course. I don't deny this and I don't try to evade it.

[Question] So you cannot shoulder the responsibility of restoring Lebanon by yourself because the Syrians are a party and so are the Palestinians, Sham'un, Sarkis and Franjiyah. The side capable of creating the detente is the state and the legitimate government. Will you tell the state: Please, go ahead, act and I am ready?

[Answer] This is what we have said and how we act and this is why I have said that we have finally opened the dossier of these issues with the government. At the end of 1978 when our resistance emerged and put an end to the Syrian-American plan, we said to the government: This is the situation, either you go and we take over or you shoulder all our responsibilities and fight for us and we put our resistance on the stage at your disposal or you put some of your legitimacy at our disposal. This issue has taken a long time and I think we are about to reach it. We will talk about this later on when we reach more practical issues. But the idea is in our head and in the state's head and is making progress. Legitimacy is the point of meeting of all the factions. We oppose it if it commits abnormal actions. But we turn a blind eye to such actions when the state's reasons call for them. We support when it is time to give support and we interact with the state on this basis. This is what has upset a lot of people. Shaykh Bashir has embarked on this line and the candidates for the ministries have become numerous. But we want no ministry, no parliament seat, no handgun license and no company lawyer [sic]. We want the cause for which 4,000 youths have died to be realized.

No Battle From Now on

[Question] On the basis of the reality, what is happening now? Some people say that the Lebanese Forces are preparing for a new round or that the south is moving toward Israel. What are the facts that you have in this regard?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the Lebanese resistance will not accept retreat or defeat. It will seek strenuously to maintain its positions and its capacity so as to achieve the goals about which we have spoken--goals that are neither Marunite nor Christian but national Lebanese goals that we want to realize in the interest of the country's real citizens. We are preparing ourselves on this basis. Such preparation has become natural since 13 April 1975. We are required to be prepared for any emergency. I don't think anybody in the south is ready to declare his allegiance to Israel or to join

it, not the Shi'ites, not the Druzes and not the Christians. The southern Lebanese is more strongly attached to his land and to his Lebaneseship than the Lebanese living here. As for the "flareup," we have been hearing this for 5 years.

[Question] But in view of the precedents, the people are prepared to believe such a thing when they hear it.

[Answer] There is a social, military and political terror being practiced against the citizen and causing him to live in an atmosphere of anxiety and fear. As for the talk about a battle atmosphere, I don't think that this is true. Who will fight us now, the Syrian or the Palestinian? Neither the Syrian will permit himself (to be dealt a slap) nor will the Palestinian engage in heroics because his base is weak and because the first tremor he causes with us or with any other Lebanese faction will cause him to lose the gains that he has scored. The Palestinian can intimidate [yitmarjal] all the Arabs but he cannot intimidate us because with the Arabs, he rises whereas with us, he falls. This is why I see no interest for anybody in a battle. I wish that the Lebanese state would exert itself and gather the Lebanese opponents, if it can and if it is convinced of this.

Question Mark Remains

[Question] Do you believe that the time has come for the state to take the initiative?

[Answer] The 4-year experience with the regime does not encourage any future optimism. Yet, we still hope.

[Question] Let us assume that President Sarkis addresses an invitation to the Lebanese opponents, both the politicians and the fighters, will such an invitation succeed?

[Answer] To us, the word fighter does not mean that our hobby is to kill. We are strugglers. The success of the invitation will depend on the agenda it presents for discussion. If the [Tunis] summit conference fails to produce the desired results, and this is what is expected, we will stay as we are because the Palestinians and the Syrians will not give the state anything, despite the honeyed words. President Sarkis may put the Lebanese face to face with their responsibilities. Will all those invited dare to respond to the invitation to a national conference? Here also there is a big question mark.

[Question] Regardless of whether the summit succeeds or it partially realizes what Lebanon wants, the Lebanese element, namely the national conference without which there is no solution, will remain essential.

[Answer] At such a time, new constitutional issues, such as a new system of government and administrative arrangements, can be discussed.

[Question] What is important is a working program consisting of a single point, namely Lebanon as an entity, a homeland and a sovereignty. The rest is details.

[Answer] This is true.

Lebanese Lobby

[Question] Why did you return from the United States a month ago with the impression that it is preparing something that is not good for Lebanon?

[Answer] My latest visit was for 4 days to attend the periodic meeting of the Lebanese-U.S. League which meets every 6 months. Insofar as we are concerned, organizing the Lebanese presence there has become very essential because any resistance in Lebanon not relying on friendships in the United States is futile. The source of the decision is the United States.

[Question] You mean that you want to create a Lebanese "lobby?"

[Answer] Exactly. When we explain to the U.S. people a just and rightful cause, they cannot but support us. This is why it was necessary to present our cause to our expatriates. They will, in an American style, present it to the U.S. officials to explain the problems from which we are suffering. I visited the United States and the expatriates 2 years ago, not to collect money or purchase weapons but to make the expatriate aware of our cause. We succeeded at the time and now the Lebanese existence expects more.

I also held routine and spontaneous meetings with influential people and decision makers there and it became evident to me that the information of the decision makers on Lebanon is faulty and that there is confusion insofar as we are concerned.

[Question] Is it faulty information or a premeditated position on the part of the United States toward you?

[Answer] The American is good by nature and harbors no premeditated intentions. He accepts matters as they are presented to him. These matters were presented to him in a faulty way that is incompatible with the reality. When we contacted the officials in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the House of Representatives and the Senate and explained to them some of the issues, they were astonished at how different from our statements were the reports they had received.

When I returned, I wanted to put matters in their true place. Many of my Lebanese brothers said: Isn't it enough that he is fighting all the sides, that he now wants to fight the United States? From a Lebanese angle, I understand this feeling. But the [my] words were addressed to the Americans so that they may know that there is a fault in their view and so that they may correct it. In my opinion, the message has been conveyed.

[Question] Let us return to the fundamental question: Has the United States taken this position toward Lebanon intentionally or did the reports drag her to it?

[Answer] Two years ago, we were not present on the U.S. stage. The Palestinians have a lobby and so do the Jews, the Kurds and the Copts whereas the one of us goes there to collect a couple piasters for the church dome or for the village school. When our presence there became concentrated, the issue was presented. Until then, the Americans were passing many things against our interest because one of the factions continued to be silent over solving the entire issue at its expense. (The United States wanted) to solve the issue of Palestine, and to give a part of Lebanon to Syria in return for the Golan. Israel was to get a part and the Christians were to be squeezed between al-Matn and Kasrawan and anybody who didn't like it could go to California and join the Vietnamese refugees. The public opinion was for the plan but when we presented our issue, matters changed. Now we can hear our voice. Next week, Bob Basil and a delegation of the Lebanese-U.S. League will come to familiarize themselves with the real situation. Last summer, we invited 25 young men and women from Lebanese extraction on what we called "roots" so that they may get acquainted with the country of their forefathers. The U.S. administration thought that it could pass the solution. Now it knows that our positions will not enable it to do so because we are people with a right and because we have not yet decided to cede anything.

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ABU DHABI TANKER FIRM WIDENS OPERATIONS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 11 Dec 79 p 7

[Article by Michael Fernandez]

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Dec. 10 (EN): Despite the stiff competition in the world tanker market, the Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company (ADNATCO) has greatly expanded its operations.

ADNATCO was established in 1975 on the recommendation of His Excellency Sheikh Tahnoon bin Mohammed Al Nahyan by President His Highness Sheikh Zayed in his capacity as Ruler of Abu Dhabi.

During the four years of its existence, the company has widened its operations to include chartering and operation of other tankers.

Captain Mohammed Saeed, general manager of ADNATCO, told the Emirates News that the company engaged British officers and Pakistani crew. A special training scheme greatly helped improve the output and efficiency of the crew, Saeed said. This, he added, together with a system of continuous surveys and maintenance and repairs, while on voyage, has resulted in increased utility of the ships.

Over a two-year period the average utility of ADNATCO tankers has

been as high as 92.7 per cent, Saeed said.

At the same time, the number of crude oil supertankers increased from three in 1977 to six in 1979 and the total crude oil transported increased from 3,150,000 tons to 6,800,000 tons.

ADNATCO has navigating and engineer cadets in training institutions and aboard the company's tankers. Other cadets are undergoing training in nautical and engineering colleges in the United Kingdom.

When they complete their courses and obtain certificates of competence, these cadets will take up responsible positions in the fleet as navigating or engineering officers.

At the same time, ADNATCO officials have been attending training courses in marine insurance, computer programming, office management and administration and chartering.

Saeed expects that the ADNATCO fleet will expand rapidly and will provide services to sister companies of ADNOC which guides, assists and fully supports ADNATCO chartering business.

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